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MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

SENIOR GENERAL CHU HUY MAN ON PARTY LEADERSHIP IN NATIONAL DEFENSE

Hanoi TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN [PEOPLE'S ARMY REVIEW] in Vietnamese No 2, Feb 81
pp 1-14

[Article by Senior General Chu Huy Man: "The Leadership of the Party--the Primary Factor Determining Victory in the Protection of the Fatherland"]

[Text] In the undertaking filled with hardships and sacrifice to save the country from powerful and wealthy country-robbers, as a result of the leadership of the party, our people arose, united in struggle to throw off the ruling yoke of colonialism and feudalism and carried out the successful August Revolution; they also won victory over extremely cruel wars of aggression waged by the French colonialists and the U.S. imperialists, thereby achieving the total independence and unification of the fatherland and advancing the entire country to socialism. In the new stage of the revolution, the same holds true, that is, the leadership of the party is always the primary factor determining victory in our people's work of building the country and protecting the socialist fatherland.

Ours is a genuine Marxist-Leninist party that is absolutely loyal to the interests of the working class, of the Vietnamese people and which has made positive contributions to the revolutionary cause of the people of the world. Our party has always firmly grasped the revolutionary and scientific essence of Marxism-Leninism and applied this only correct science of revolution in our times to the specific conditions of our country better with each passing day. The party has adopted a correct and creative line, one which includes a political line, a line on economic development, a military line, a domestic affairs line and a foreign affairs line, in order to complete the tasks of the nation and fulfill our international obligations. Our party has been forged for many years in the flames of the revolutionary struggle, a struggle filled with hardships, in the war of liberation and in the very fierce wars to defend the country against many cruel enemies; it has experienced many very arduous challenges, including seemingly insurmountable challenges. However, our party has always led our army and people in overcoming every difficulty and our nation of Vietnam has always won extremely glorious victories. In the process, our party has gained many valuable experiences, experiences in armed uprisings and revolutionary war, experiences in guiding production and building and managing the economy under war time circumstances and so forth. Our party has also gained experience while performing international tasks. Our party is truly the strategic staff of the working class and nation of Vietnam, is a strong and determined corps within the international communist and worker movement.

We maintain that, in the face of the new and no less arduous, decisive and complex challenges of the period of building and protecting the fatherland, our party will surely complete its glorious historic tasks. The organizations, cadres and members of our party will surely make greater progress, both in terms of their ability to help formulate lines and organize their implementation and in terms of their revolutionary will and sentiments, thereby proving themselves worthy of the trust of the people and our international friends.

I. A Correct Line, the Ability To Provide Guidance and the Ability To Perform Practical Organizational Work

After the fatherland was completely liberated and the country was reunified, the 4th Congress of the Party set forth the revolutionary line for the entire period of transition to socialism. It is the platform of building socialism and protecting the socialist fatherland in the new era of our nation of Vietnam. It is the banner of inevitable victory of our people as they march forward to make our country a country that has a modern industrial-agricultural structure, a strong national defense system, a progressive culture, science and technology and a civilized and happy life. It is also the banner of inevitable victory of our army and people in the work of protecting the fatherland and in the effort to strengthen the national defense system and build up the people's armed forces as well as in the process of waging a people's war to protect the fatherland against every enemy aggressor, both the Beijing reactionaries and the imperialists.

The military line of our party in the period of building and protecting the fatherland reflects the revolutionary line and the revolutionary method of the party and, at the same time, reflects the laws of armed struggle, of a patriotic war under the new historic conditions of our nation and our times. It is an integral part of the party's line on the socialist revolution. It is the result of correctly and creatively applying the Marxist-Leninist theory on war and the army to the realities of Vietnam in order to resolve problems related to national defense and the war to protect the fatherland and, at the same time, help to enrich the storehouse of experience and theory regarding Marxist-Leninist military science. It has inherited and developed upon the military line of the party in the war of liberation and the war to defend the country and raised our forefathers' tradition of unyielding resistance against foreign aggression and outstanding strategic genius, a tradition displayed in thousands of years of struggling to defend the country, to a new level.

During the periods of the resistance against the French and the resistance against the United States, the military line of the party was gradually formed through the realities of fighting and winning victory over the enemy. Our party led the war while researching and summarizing experiences and formulating and gradually perfecting its military line. As a result, today, as we begin the fight against the new enemy aggressor, our party has been able from the very outset to resolve the most important problems regarding how to protect the fatherland. The military line of the party was formed on the basis of the major viewpoints and thoughts expressed in the resolution of the 4th Party Congress and has been concretized and developed upon in subsequent resolutions of the Party Central Committee, the Political Bureau and the Central Military Party Committee. This development was proven to be very correct

by the realities of the building of the national defense system, the buildup of the people's armed forces and the conduct of the people's war to protect the fatherland in the southwestern and northern regions of our country. It is the all the people defend the nation line and the line on the people's war to protect the socialist Vietnamese fatherland.

Both theory and the realities of history have pointed out that, today, thoroughly understanding the political line and the military line of the party is the most basic, the most decisive factor in winning victory in the work of protecting the fatherland and building socialism.

Of direct, decisive significance in turning the line of the party into a combined strength, into specific results, into real victory is practical organizational work. This work encompasses many areas and is closely linked to the various periods of development of the revolution; it is the work of all organizations of the party, from the central level to the local level and the basic level and within the units of the army, with the most important areas being the close strategic guidance provided by the Party Central Committee and the Political Bureau.

In the new stage, while the party is leading every aspect of the activities of all of society throughout the country in socialist construction and the protection of the fatherland, practical organizational work involves many new specifics and requirements in peace time as well as when war breaks out.

When war breaks out, the party must lead the people in making every effort to build the economy, develop the culture and stabilize and gradually improve the living conditions of the people in conjunction with strengthening our national defense potentials and building the material-technical bases of socialism. It is necessary to build up the people's armed forces, build defense lines and strategic bases, build the great rear area of the entire country and the immediate rear area of each battlefield and so forth, thereby creating a strong, firm battle position for the national defense system and the people's war to protect the fatherland. The coordination of the central task of building the economy with strengthening our national defense potentials throughout the country as well as within each locality must be based on the general strategic guidelines for the entire country and must, at the same time, be consistent with the special characteristics of each locality, with the economic, political and military positions of each battlefield, each province, municipality and district. On this basis, we must establish specific targets and develop the various localities so that they possess relatively comprehensive and reliable strength, thereby insuring that they complete their local task and the task of supporting the frontlines in case of war. At this time, practical organizational work, although not as difficult and decisive as practical organizational work conducted under war time circumstances, when it is necessary to directly deal with the enemy, is still very complex in many areas. We must constantly improve the organization and the building of the structure to be consistent with newly developing conditions, adopt specific programs, policies and plans and establish close coordination among the various sectors within the dictatorship of the proletariat system, among the various localities and so forth with a view toward achieving specific national defense objectives during each period of time and insure that each

locality and the entire country are always in a high state of combat readiness while still focusing their efforts on their construction tasks, instead of separating the economy from the national defense system or cause one to pose obstacles to the other.

The present shortcomings and weaknesses of our state in organizational work and in the management of every aspect of the activities of society, which include national defense activities and the coordination of the national defense system with the economy within each locality and throughout the country, are also the shortcomings and weaknesses of our party. They reflect the fact that the ability of the various party organizations to perform practical organizational work in the protection of the fatherland under peace time circumstances is still limited. We must clearly recognize that organization is a science and must make every effort to learn and gain experience in order to carry out these practical tasks well and put the effort to strengthen the national defense system within a mechanism, put it on a regular and stable basis so that we are ready to win victory should war occur.

In the case in which the enemy recklessly unleashes a war of aggression against our country, the guidance of the war effort primarily involves mobilizing the people to fight, to actively fight, to engage in productive labor and continue to increase their strength in order to attack the enemy and bring the war to a victorious conclusion.

The most important problem in the case of war is that the strategic guidance provided by the Party Central Committee and the Political Bureau must quickly reach the various party committee echelons, localities, sectors and levels and must be complied with unconditionally. Under the circumstances of modern warfare, it is still possible for us to correctly predict changes in the basic situation; however, it cannot be said that these changes always occur in exact accordance with our understanding and aspirations. A war to protect the fatherland can break out and reach a turning point very quickly. Winning a major victory over the enemy army at the start of a war is of very important, decisive significance to the entire war. As a result, in guiding a war effort, the strict requirements that must be met are: seizing strategic initiative and developing upon this initiative from the very outset and making a great effort to annihilate many enemy forces from the very outset, thereby changing the comparison of forces, changing the situation so that it is favorable to us and unfavorable to the enemy and so that we win victory in every situation.

The art of guiding a war effort in such a way as to meet the requirements mentioned above demands that our party firmly grasp the laws of a people's war to protect the fatherland, take the initiative and skillfully employ these laws by means of its intelligence and spirit of boldness in conjunction with its ability to perform urgent organizational work. We must achieve a highly developed combined strength within a combined strategy that is based primarily on military struggle while coordinating with the other forces and phases of struggle in order to concentrate our force on a specific strategic objective during key periods of time and at key places in order to win decisive victory. As a result, our party and the organizations of the party must possess tremendous energy and must have the ability to organize implementation in a skillful, scientific, tight and strict manner from the very outset.

Leading a war effort is the task of both the Party Central Committee and the local party committee echelons. The basic party committees and the party chapters also fulfill the function of leading the war effort within their locality and unit. One effort of foremost, decisive importance--an effort that must be steadfastly maintained--is to organize and mobilize all the people to fight the enemy, maintain control, fight the enemy and engage in productive labor at the same time in order to complete local tasks and provide battlefield support.

Under the direct leadership of the Party Central Committee and the Political Bureau, the army party organization is the nucleus in the effort to organize the implementation of the party's military line and apply Vietnamese military science and art in a war to protect the fatherland when war breaks out. On the basis of the functions and tasks assigned by the party, the Central Military Party Committee researches strategic matters in order to make proposals to the Political Bureau and the Party Central Committee and leads and guides the entire army in implementation. The various military regions, military corps, branches and agencies must organize implementation in a creative manner under the direct guidance of the Central Military Party Committee in order to win a decisive victory on each battlefield.

In war, the creative application of the military art of a people's war to protect the fatherland is very important. Our cadres, who have been trained in principles and theory at academies and schools and forged on the training field, will be directly challenged on the battlefield, primarily on the first defense line. This challenge, which comes in the form of iron, steel and flames, very rapidly shows us the solutions to military problems, even during the very first hours and days of the decisive test of strength with the enemy. The collectives of the party committees and the command cadres on the various levels and at the various agencies must have a firm grasp of the basic principles they have learned; however, they must display a high degree of intelligence, talent and energy in organizing implementation. They must have a firm grasp of military art and take the initiative and be creative in the application of this art; however, they must scrupulously obey and implement strategic guidance, thereby making a positive contribution to seizing strategic initiative, as mentioned above, even when the enemy still has many forces, many weapons and many means of war.

To fulfill their task in the protection of the fatherland, the organizations of the party on the various levels, cadres and party members must rapidly improve their ability to perform practical organizational work and closely coordinate ideological and organizational work in order to overcome the phenomenon of doing things in a simple, lax manner and the phenomenon of "form for form's sake." They must struggle to meet the highest possible requirements and the greatest challenges.

In order to strengthen its leadership at a time when it is in political power throughout the country, the party must constantly perfect the organizational structure of the party, the state and the mass organizations and perfect the mechanism "the party leads, the people exercise ownership and the state manages" in socialist construction, economic management and the protection of the fatherland.

The 4th Congress of the Party pointed out that building a national defense system of all the people is the task of all the people, the entire army and the entire

dictatorship of the proletariat system under the leadership of the party. The problem we face is correctly establishing, by means of the organization of systems, the relationship among the party, the state and the people and developing the effectiveness of the mechanism proposed by the congress not only within the task of building the country, but in the task of protecting the fatherland as well.

The apparatus that leads and manages economic construction, cultural development, the living conditions of the people and the building of the national defense system must be a competent and sensitive apparatus, both in peace time and when war breaks out. When war breaks out, this apparatus must organize the conduct of a people's war in order to win victory over aggressors and protect the fatherland and must manage the construction of the material and technical bases of socialism under war time circumstances. Of course, this apparatus must be supplemented or adjusted when necessary so that it is suited to the situation and tasks in time of war.

The political report delivered at the 4th Congress of the Party pointed out: "As the tool for building socialism and protecting socialism, our state must always attach importance to strengthening national security, political security and social order to insure that the country is always ready and always has the strength to crush every attack of those who would start a war and of aggressors as well as crush acts of opposition by counter-revolutionaries."

As a result, the party must concern itself with building the state apparatus, strengthening the system of law, formulate laws, build the organization, establish regulations and so forth. The party must build and forge the state apparatus so that it is fully capable of managing the economy, managing society and strengthening the national defense system in peace time; when war breaks out, this apparatus must respond very quickly to the guidance of the war effort provided by the Party Central Committee and Political Bureau by means of its abundant vitality, discipline in coordination and strict practical application.

If the building of the party is separated from the building of the state apparatus and light attention is given to the government, it is clear that the effectiveness of the party's leadership will also decline. Because, ours is a party in political power and "the leadership of the party and the right of collective ownership of the people are most vividly manifested in the state and primarily implemented through the activities of the state."(1)

In view of the fact that it is a party in political power, the lines, positions and policies of the party in the building of the country as well as in the protection of the fatherland are concretized and codified and become binding upon every citizen, every agency of the party and state and every mass organization. Only in this way is it possible to develop the effectiveness of the party's leadership. The resolution of the 8th Party Plenum concerning the draft of the Constitution pointed out: "The Constitution and laws are the basic positions and policies of the party that have been codified, have been 'institutionalized in the form of the state' so that they are obeyed by everyone." This is a new requirement in practical organizational work to a party in political power. We should not consider the laws of the state to contain nothing that belongs to the party. We must coordinate education and motivation

with compulsion under the law in order to develop the spirit of collective ownership and uphold the right of collective ownership of the masses so that every position and policy of the party is implemented in a scrupulous manner. "The party compels its organizations, cadres and members to respect the power of state agencies and scrupulously comply with the law and with the decisions and directives of state agencies, considering this to be the discipline of the party." (2)

The right of socialist collective ownership of the people as regards the national defense system as well as in a people's war is expressed not only through the state, but also through the mass organizations. When building the state apparatus and developing the role played by the state, the party must attach full importance to the role played by the mass organizations, such as the Trade Union, the Youth Union, the Women's Union, etc. It is necessary to motivate, organize and rally the people to implement their right of collective ownership in the protection of the fatherland through these organizations.

The mass organizations have the tasks of teaching the people and fulfilling their role in strengthening the national defense system and insuring that everyone fights the enemy. Each stratum of the people, each citizen must do their very best to participate in the work of strengthening the national defense system, building up the people's armed forces, participating in combat and combat support and so forth in case of war. The mass organizations must be schools of patriotism, socialism and communism. In particular, they must teach the youths of the entire country to scrupulously fulfill their military obligation and labor obligation.

In the various periods of development of the country, in general, as well as the revolution over the past half-century, our generations of youths have always been worthy of being the shock forces of the fatherland, of the party. Today, in the work of building and protecting the country, the force of youths is becoming increasingly large and increasingly talented. They are an army that has all the ability and intelligence needed to attack the fields of science, to become the masters of science and technology within enterprises and workunits, in fields, at research institutes and so forth, thereby making a positive contribution to the creation of the material wealth and spiritual and cultural values of the country. They are a force filled with heroism and also have the knowledge needed to become the masters of weapons, thereby helping to create invincible strength in the effort to protect the fatherland. They are the generations succeeding their fathers and older brothers in developing upon the achievements of the revolution, a generation that has a firm grasp of the truth and is always in the vanguard of the revolutionary undertaking of the fatherland. The mass organizations must make the force of youths understand that every expectation of the young can only be achieved and every talent of the young can only be developed in their beloved country by means of coordinating academic education with working and fighting. Our youths must consider this to be their source of happiness. For this reason, President Ho taught: "Training the revolutionary generations for the future is very important and necessary work."

The mass organizations must also mobilize the people to perform good rear service work so that, when war breaks out, the rear service is truly the firm base, the

tremendous source of mobilization of manpower and materiel for the frontlines as well as a strong source of inspiration to the soldiers on the frontline.

Adopting the correct line is a matter of very basic, very decisive importance but it is not enough. We must also have the ability to provide guidance and organize implementation in order to turn this line into real victory. In other words, the correct line must be accompanied by creative organizational ability; these two closely linked factors cause the leadership of the party to truly become the primary factor determining victory in the cause of protecting the fatherland and building the country. "We must bring about a profound change of a revolutionary nature in our viewpoint concerning the building of the organization, must improve management and must make every effort to close the gap between the requirements of the political task and our organizational skills, thereby bringing organizational work to the level of the political task and supporting the requirements of the political task well." (3)

Building a Party That Is Strong Politically, Ideologically and Organizationally

In the revolution, in general, as well as in the protection of the fatherland, in particular, the party must be built so that it is strong throughout its organization, strong from its nerve center to its basic cells. This strength must not only exist from the very outset, when a war is not in progress, and exist throughout the course of building and strengthening the national defense system, but must be increased even more when war breaks out, increased throughout the entire process of the war and expressed in the form of successfully completing the political task and military task of the party in the various periods.

In the leadership of the revolutionary struggle, especially at turning points and in the face of important developments, the entire party must be united with regard to its line, must thoroughly understand and unswervingly adhere to this line in every situation, must organize the implementation of this line in a creative manner and, in this way, must help to formulate, concretize and develop the line of the party. It is necessary to protect the line, protect the leadership, protect the unity and discipline of the party.

The same holds true in the military field. The entire party must be in agreement concerning the political line and the military line, concerning the evaluation of enemy forces and our forces and concerning the strategy of the party. There must be agreement from the very outset and this agreement must become stronger with each passing day. It is necessary to unswervingly adhere to the line, organize its implementation and protect the line in every situation, not only in peace time, but also when war breaks out and throughout the course of development of a war, especially in difficult, decisive situations that will determine whether or not the war ends in victory.

One matter of basic importance in the line is that of correctly establishing the strategic objective of our country's revolution and the combat objective of our army and people. Today, the reactionaries within Beijing ruling circles are collaborating with the U.S. imperialists and various lackeys to weaken and annex our

country, annex the countries of Indochina, sweep into Southeast Asia and eventually become rulers of the planet. We must continuously consolidate and strengthen the unanimity within the party concerning the analysis and evaluation of the reactionary nature and the capabilities of the enemy; we must steadfastly maintain this unanimity throughout the course of a war, especially at turning points in the war, and through the decisive tests of strength between ourselves and the enemy on the battlefield, both on the frontlines and in the rear area as well.

As we know, the political objectives of the revolutionary struggle and revolutionary war are the same; however, a war is governed by laws of its own. An unjust war of aggression and a just war of self-defense develop in accordance with opposite laws. Aggressors concentrate their forces and means of war not only at the very outset in a vain attempt to win decisive victory in a short time, but also throughout the development of the war, especially at highpoints in the war. Even after suffering defeats, sometimes heavy defeats of strategic significance, the enemy might try to escalate the war to its highest level ever in a vain attempt to win back lost positions and reverse the situation. However, when we steadfastly adhere to the line, unswervingly adhere to our determination and overcome the highest war effort of the enemy, we will crush the forces of the enemy and the total defeat of the enemy thus becomes unavoidable. Experience has shown that, in certain situations, at certain times and on certain battlefields, it appears as though the enemy is still increasing its strength; in actuality, however, we find that they have become weak and have weakened very rapidly; this is seen in their insane writhing, writhing that easily causes persons to mistakenly think that they are strong. In such complex situations and at such difficult and decisive turning points, achieving agreement within the party concerning the evaluation of enemy capabilities can provide an opportunity to challenge cadres and party members as regards their spirit of steadfastness and their viewpoint concerning the enemy, in terms of strategy, the campaign and combat. If the unanimity achieved through this challenge is consolidated and strengthened slowly, it will adversely affect the unity and oneness of mind within the party, adversely affect the fighting capabilities of troops and our ability to win victory.

The same applies with regard to us; there is generally agreement from the very outset, very rapid agreement concerning the evaluation of our strength, of our strongpoints as well as our weaknesses and of our possibilities for development. However, this is not sufficient. We must steadfastly maintain this unanimity throughout the course of development of a war, especially at turning points and after decisive tests of strength with the enemy on the battlefield. Each time we win victory, we usually suffer certain losses; with these victories, the difficulties and shortages that existed before them can be reduced; however, new difficulties and shortages arise as a result of the new requirements of development. In this situation, there are times at which and units in which it appears, on the outside, that our strength is declining; actually, however, such is not the case. The comparison between ourselves and the enemy in terms of position and power, quality and the primary trend of development is advantageous to us. If our cadres and party members are not fully forged, if they are not familiar with or do not dare to squarely face the difficulties involved in our growth following victory, they might suffer a decline in their energy to overcome difficulties and might not be determined to boldly develop upon victories. This is another challenge to cadres and party members in terms of their

steadfastness, their confidence in the capabilities and potentials of revolutionary forces.

Therefore, when we say that the leadership of the party is the primary factor determining victory in war, one very important matter is to achieve a correct evaluation and unanimity within the party concerning the general situation of the revolution and our advantages and difficulties in the course of development as well as the enemy's situation and our situation from the very outset and during each period of the war. At turning points and in the face of decisive tests of strength between ourselves and the enemy, unanimity within the party concerning the evaluation of the situation reaffirms the fundamentals set forth by the party and inevitable trend of development of the war and achieving this unanimity is a process of challenging cadres and party members and forging our party so that it is strong politically, ideologically and organizationally.

It is necessary to build party organizations that are truly strong and pure, that are fully capable of leading all the people and the entire army in successfully completing the task of building the country and protecting the fatherland. The revolutionary undertaking constantly develops on an increasingly large scale; however, it does not follow a straight or simple path, but experiences difficulties and travels a winding path to the ultimate objective. The same is true with regard to protecting the fatherland. A war of aggression, if unleashed by the enemy, is a major, comprehensive challenge to our country. War tests the line, thinking, viewpoints, will and organizational ability of our party and state. In order to firmly insure victory in the work of building and strengthening the national defense system as well as in a war to protect the fatherland when one occurs, it is necessary to have a party that is truly strong and pure. The party and its organizations must be the nucleus uniting, mobilizing and organizing millions of persons to fight, work and produce filled with confidence. The party and its organizations must be the competent command staff that is capable of engaging in profound thought, capable of performing truly scientific organizational work and capable of coordinating every force on every battle line in accordance with a strict combat discipline, thereby insuring victory over the enemy in every circumstance.

The party organization and the organizations of the party within the armed forces must be the strong nucleus in the most difficult situations and in the face of the most stern challenges. The basic organization of the party and the party chapters must be the shock forces leading the collectives of units forward, leading them in combat and victory over the enemy in the worst of situations. To accomplish this, the basic organizations and party chapters must constantly maintain close relations with the masses, must blend with the masses in order to build units, build them politically, ideologically and organizationally, build them into a steel bloc. The party committees on the various echelons must be strengthened in terms of their organization and personnel in both peace time and time of war. We must emphasize the collective leadership role of the party committee echelon in conjunction with heightening the responsibility of the commander, thereby insuring that troops are led, commanded and managed in such a way that they complete every task and win victory over the enemy.

The building of the organizations of the party must be closely linked to the completion of the political task and the military task of the unit during each period. The organizations of the party and each party member must be forged through the completion of the tasks of the unit during each period. The building of a good organization is designed to develop good personnel; party members who have been forged well are a prerequisite to building a party organization that is strong and pure.

A strong party with a strong organizational structure must go hand in hand with a corps of party members that is routinely supplemented in terms of its size and constantly improves in terms of its quality. The matters of foremost importance that determine the comprehensive quality of the party member are awareness of the ideals of communism and boundless loyalty to the fatherland, the people and the international obligation. The party member must endeavor throughout his life to achieve the lofty goals of the revolution and must do so with precise motives in mind. The enlightenment of each party member must be expressed in positive, creative actions, in every task assigned by the party. In his daily work as well as in combat, the communist party member must always be in the vanguard; communist party members must be in the vanguard in terms of their outlook, their thinking and their ability to take action, thereby achieving practical results in their combat, work and productive labor. The role of the party member must not only be manifested in normal times, in advantageous times, but must especially be manifested in a natural way in times of combat, under the most difficult and serious circumstances and in the face of the greatest challenges.

A corps of party members who possess well developed political qualities and organizational skills consistent with the level of development of the revolution is a very important requirement in order for the party to constantly maintain and strengthen its leadership role. Every party member must bring himself abreast of the continuous development of the revolution; this is an expression of his loyalty and his desire to make progress. The party member must never divorce himself from the basic goals of the revolution; he must always maintain a correct point of view and establish clear relationships in combat, work and his daily activities. As regards the enemies of the revolution, of the people, he must be definite and unshakeable, both in the face of their military power and their temptations. As regards the party, party members must be determined to implement the lines and policies of the party, determined to protect the lines and organization and maintain the discipline of the party. As regards the people, they must love them and respect the right of collective ownership of each person. They must be loyal and devoted to their comrades. They must be humble and simple in dealings with their friends. Party members must fight with no thought for themselves, must live faithful and simple lives and must not only express these qualities under normal circumstances, but under complex and difficult circumstances as well. Party members who are elderly, who have served for many years in the party and who occupy positions of leadership must display these virtues even more clearly and purely. The corps of party members must constantly study and train in order to acquire comprehensive, basic and highly specialized knowledge. They must study and train constantly so that they can learn the latest achievements in the social sciences, the natural sciences and the technical sciences of the country and our times and turn them into assets of the people, of the fatherland. Learning and constantly making progress is a challenge to the communist, primarily to those comrades who have fought for many years and have made certain contributions to the revolution.

Building a strong party that has a strong, pure organizational structure and a corps of party members who possess the necessary skills and political qualities mentioned above is a difficult job and requires continuous effort.

Once the correct line has been adopted, the matter that directly determines the success of this line is the organization of its implementation, and, in practical organizational work, the corps of cadres plays the decisive role, especially with regard to our army when implementing the "one person in command" system. In the new stage, the tasks of building socialism and protecting the socialist fatherland demand that the corps of cadres possess higher organizational and managerial skills in every area. Our party and state must build and forge a corps of cadres who possess good political qualities and are skilled in taking action. The corps of cadres must be large enough for the various organizations within the dictatorship of the proletariat system and must meet both the immediate and long-range requirements of building and protecting the fatherland. This corps of cadres must consist of cadres who provide guidance and management in economics, the culture, society, highly specialized fields, productive labor, scientific research, etc. This corps of cadres must be built in exact accordance with the working class line of the party and in exact accordance with strict selection of guidelines and standards consistent with the development of our society. In order to make a positive contribution to the protection of the fatherland and fulfill the task of building the country, our cadres, regardless of their field of activity outside the army, must possess certain military knowledge. Only in this way can we smoothly coordinate the economy and the defense of the nation, coordinate building and combat.

The corps of cadres of the party within the army must be trained and forged so that it is strong enough to serve as the nucleus of the effort to build the national defense system, the nucleus of the building of powerful people's armed forces and the nucleus of a victorious people's war to protect the fatherland. We must formulate cadre planning and build a corps of cadres whose structure is well coordinated and consists of increasingly developed command cadres, political cadres, scientific-technical cadres and specialized cadres as well as skilled scientific research cadres, theoretical research cadres and instructors. Cadres must receive basic, comprehensive and highly specialized training so that they can excellently complete every task assigned to them by the party and state. When a party member becomes a cadre, the basic standards regarding his political qualities and ability to take action must be higher. Fortunately, the vast majority of the cadres of the party within the army today have been directly forged for many years in the patriotic war and in the revolutionary movement of the masses, thus accumulating much valuable experience. However, we cannot be satisfied or stop at this point, rather, cadres must make every effort to study and make continuous progress. Cadres must see the new requirements that exist in the new stage of the revolution, that lie along the path of building socialism and protecting the socialist fatherland. The abilities and qualities of cadres can only be developed when cadres always keep abreast of the requirements of the revolution, of the continuous development of the revolutionary struggle and actively endeavor to make progress. Scientific and technical cadres must develop their talents, reach the pinnacles of world science and technology and learn the very best knowledge of the nation with a view toward achieving the goal of making the fatherland prosperous and strong and bringing happiness to the people.

Only by raising the matter in this manner is it possible for there to be steadfast efforts on the part of each individual cadre as well as the agencies that organize and manage cadres.

On the basis of a large corps of cadres who are deployed and engaged in activities in all fields of the country, the party must select a corps of high level cadres who are competent, firm and pure in every set of circumstances and in the face of every development of the revolution. High level cadres are the persons who bear major responsibility for organizing the successful implementation of the party's line and turn it into the strength of millions of persons in productive labor and combat. High level cadres are also persons who are highly capable of contributing to the formulation of the lines and policies of the party through their practical activities. High level cadres also play a very important role and have a very important task in training the corps of successors and preparing the persons to replace them for the sake of the interests of the revolution. When a cadre is assigned a more difficult task, the scope of his activities and his relationships, consequently, become broader and, as a result, this cadre assumes heavier responsibilities with regard to protect the prestige and reputation of the party by means of the examples he sets and his practical activities. The same applies within the armed forces; high ranking cadres are persons who control and utilize large forces of personnel, equipment and weapons and who occupy important positions in both combat and work. The ability, spirit and style of a high ranking cadre in both combat and work are most clearly evident in annihilating the enemy and winning the largest possible victory in combat with the lowest possible loss of our forces, thereby influencing the strength of the unit and the confidence of lower ranking cadres and soldiers in a positive manner. In guidance, command activities and management, high ranking cadres must establish the correct relationship between the collective and the individual and must respect and listen to the correct opinions of the lower level; instead of relying upon the collective, upon the upper level, they must make decisions in a full spirit of responsibility while not being authoritarian or arbitrary. They must maintain a simple, wholesome style of life. The party must have a long-term plan for selecting high ranking cadres; at the same time, the party must give this corps of cadres a clear understanding of their position and role in the common undertaking of the country and the people.

For more than one-half century, under the leadership of the party, our nation of Vietnam has continuously waged extremely difficult fights filled with sacrifices against cruel aggression by many large enemies. In the historic tests of strength, which were matters of survival to our nation and of tremendous international significance, our people won total victory over imperialism and have also won victory over the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists.

However, the ambition of the enemy remains. The reactionary rulers in Beijing are continuing to pursue their insidious scheme to weaken and annex our country in order to sweep into Southeast Asia in a vain attempt to become rulers of the world. They are frantically looking for every way to collaborate with the imperialists, primarily the U.S. imperialists, in order to carry out their long-range, sinister scheme.

However, our people and armed forces have the correct, wise and experienced leadership of the party. Our ability to defend the country is greater than ever before. We have our militant solidarity with the fraternal peoples of Laos and Kampuchea. We have comprehensive cooperation with and tremendous, effective assistance in many areas from the Soviet Union and the other fraternal socialist countries and the sympathy and support of friends throughout the world. In our just undertaking and amidst the great strength of our nation and our times, our generation of today and the generations of tomorrow possess and shall possess the determination and skills, the will and ability, the intelligence and confidence to build a prosperous and strong Vietnam, forever protect the beloved Vietnamese socialist fatherland and make worthy contributions to the cause of revolution and peace in the Far East, in Southeast Asia and the world.

FOOTNOTES

1. The Political Report at the 4th Party Congress.
2. The resolution of the 4th Party Congress.
3. The Political Bureau resolution on organizational work, November 1980.

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CSO: 4209/358

MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

FUNCTION, AUTHORITY OF MILITARY CONTROL FORCES CLARIFIED

Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 12 Jun 81 p 3

[Article by "Chien Si Dieu Lenh" [Ordinance Combatant] in "Understanding Orders and Regulations" Column: "Function and Authority of Military Control Forces"]

[Text] Question: What are the function and authority of the military control forces? How can one distinguish a genuine military control armyman from an impostor with bad intentions? Who has the right to control military men and to exercise military control?

Answer: The functions of the military control forces are:

--To maintain military discipline, state law and social order and security with regard to all armyman and military transportation means outside barracks.

--To cooperate with and assist the public security force and others in maintaining political security and social order and security within the assigned area.

The above-mentioned two functions are related, sometimes closely; however, the military control forces must consider the first function as the permanent and most important one.

In carrying out their duty, armyman in charge of military control have the following power:

--Remind and correct military men who violate orders and discipline.

--Control and inspect documents, luggage and goods of military men and military transportation means whenever they show any sign of infringement of law or discipline at places determined by the commander of the troops' stationing areas.

--Arrest and detain military men committing a serious infraction of law or discipline and bring them to the troops' stationing area for judgment by the high echelons.

--Search, arrest and detain military men caught red-handed violating the law as well as the persons involved in such cases and seize the evidence--if any--according to law.

--Use weapons if the lawbreaker resists and endangers the lives of the army men in charge of military control and the lives of other people or if the person guilty of serious lawbreaking refuses to obey the "stop" or "hands up" order, runs away or offers resistance.

Except for the above-mentioned provisions, army men in charge of military control are not allowed to confiscate anything from military men such as military equipment, jewelry and so forth.

At present, army men in charge of military control wear on their left arms a red band with the letters "Military Control" and are provided with credentials made after a uniform pattern used by the entire army (there are three types of military control credentials which are all made of printed forms).

--Whenever a military control army man who wants to exercise control over another military man is requested by the latter to show his credentials, he must show his credentials together with his identity card.

--Army men in charge of military control are subjected to control by the commander of the troops' station area and his assistant cadres and also by the cadres bearing credentials empowering them to exercise control over the military control forces. (Whenever a cadre wants to exercise control over army men who are carrying out their military control duty, he must show his credentials and identity card.)

All military control credentials must be made of the printed forms available and will be considered valid only if they bear the signature and seal of a division commander or his equivalent or superior.

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MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

BEIJING CALLED CENTER OF SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES IN ASIA

Hanoi TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN [PEOPLE'S ARMY REVIEW] in Vietnamese No 2, Feb 81
pp 50-55

[Article by Tran Trong: "Fomenting Rebellions--a Dangerous Method of the Beijing Expansionists"]

[Text] For a long time, fomenting rebellions has been one of the dangerous methods employed by Beijing to achieve expansion and power and annex neighboring countries in Southeast Asia and South Asia.

Beijing's method of fomenting rebellions is basically the same as the methods of fomenting rebellions employed by the imperialists and reactionaries since antiquity. However, due to the specific characteristics of Chinese expansionism and hegemony, the rebellions fomented by them are different in many ways from the rebellions engineered by the imperialists, in terms of viewpoint and thinking, the organization of forces and the measures employed. Thus, what are the characteristics of the scheme of the Beijing expansionists of fomenting rebellions and what activities do they employ to foment rebellions?

Reviewing the various rebellions fomented by Beijing, one sees certain characteristics in the nature of laws in their scheme of fomenting rebellions.

1. The Organizations and Activities Employed by Beijing To Foment Rebellions Are Generally Called "Revolutionary" but Are Based on the Viewpoints and Strategic Objectives of Expansionism and Annexation

It is not surprising that the rulers in Beijing have long liked to talk about the so called "great world rebellion." Facts have shown that this viewpoint is not only designed to create a tense situation in the world and provoke the psychology of war, but also designed to camouflage a very insidious and malicious strategy. It is the strategy of fomenting rebellions, causing neighboring countries to constantly be unstable and causing them to fall into a state of chaos so that they can control these countries or topple their governments and replace them with lackey governments.

In its scheme of creating a prolonged and pervasive state of "rebellion" in a number of countries, Beijing generally sets forth such fraudulent revolutionary viewpoints as

"lying in ambush for a long time" and "waging a protracted armed struggle," which, in essence, are designed to "harrass on a long-term basis" other countries by means of counter-revolutionary rebellions. The rebellions and the insurgent forces that have been guided and supported by Beijing in a number of countries, such as India, Burma, Thailand and so forth, for many years prove this.

As is the case with the rebellions fomented by the imperialists, the rebellions organized by Beijing are generally closely associated with massacres and barbarous terror. According to foreign press reports, at a number of places, such as northeast India, Burma and so forth, local reactionary lackeys of Beijing have massacred thousands of persons in rebellions. Their organizations that foment rebellions in various countries are called by very "revolutionary" names, such as "the Marxist-Leninist Communist Party"(Thailand), the "Social Party"(Laos), the "National Front for National Salvation"(Laos), the "Fraternal Islamic Organization"(Afghanistan), etc. The rebellions fomented by them in other countries are described as "revolutionary struggles" and they proclaim that "supporting revolutionary struggles(!) is the international obligation that China must fulfill." For decades, Beijing has been and is using more than a small amount of money, weapons and cadres to support and employ reactionary forces in Southeast Asia and South Asia.

As an important measure in the long-range strategy of expansionism of Chinese hegemonism, Beijing's scheme of fomenting rebellions has actually become a primary and constant danger threatening the independence and security of other countries and the stability of all Southeast Asia and South Asia.

2. Organizing, Supporting and Making Coordinated Use of All Reactionary Forces as Tools for Fomenting Rebellion

In the rebellions masterminded by Beijing, we generally see the participation of many different reactionary forces. These primary forces consist of:

--Local reactionary elements, who include landowners, reactionary bourgeoisie, dissatisfied and opposition elements and the leaders of reactionary political parties. In ethnic minority areas, Beijing usually tries to win over the leaders of tribes and the leaders of smuggling organizations. A typical example of this is the fact that Beijing has, for decades, been making every effort to "build a base" among the Meo Tribes living in the northern border areas of Vietnam, Laos, Thailand and Burma and among the ethnic minorities in northeast India, Nepal and Pakistan. Another clear example is that the ringleaders of the opium smugglers in the "golden triangle"(which lies along the borders of Burma, Thailand, Laos and China) have long had close ties to Beijing.

--The ringleaders of bandits and traitors who live in exile, having fled to foreign countries: these include such persons as Vang Pao and Cong Le (from Laos), Pol Pot, Ieng Sary, Khieu Samphan, Son Sen and Sihanouk (Kampuchea), Hoang Van Hoan (Vietnam), etc. The western press reported that, in 1978, when Vang Pao was invited to Beijing, the Chinese authorities "rolled out the red carpet as though he were a head of state." Each time Cong Ly, Pol Pot and Ieng Sary have gone to Beijing, they have been "received

at Dieu Ngu Dai--a place reserved for receiving heads of state." They were received so "formally" because they (with the exception of Hoang Van Hoan) still control a number of bandits hiding in Thailand who are forces that are "highly rated" by Beijing for use in fomenting rebellions. The reactionaries within the ethnic minorities along the northern border of Vietnam that fled to live in China, proclaiming themselves to be the Meo king, the Thai king, the Nhung king and so forth, and the reactionary tribal chiefs of the Islamic minorities in Afghanistan who are supported by Beijing in Pakistan are also of this type.

--The "emigre" reactionaries, the majority of whom are puppet officers and enlisted men and puppet government personnel in South Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea who committed many crimes, refused to undergo transformation and fled the country. In 1979, Beijing sent one group of "security cadres" after another to the "refugee camps" in Thailand and declared that they would select from 16,000 to 20,000 persons to be sent to Hai Nam Island in China for training. In early 1980, according to western news reports, they recruited 6,000 persons and organized them into two divisions in preparation for sending them to commit acts of sabotage and foment rebellions in the countries of Indochina. Beijing has been trying for many years to organize and train forces of this type. According to western news reports, Beijing has so far established 40 training camps for this type of reactionaries in Tay Tang and 20 special training camps controlled by Chinese advisors in Pakistan for the purpose of supporting their scheme to foment armed rebellion in India and Afghanistan.

--The "underground army of ethnic Chinese" is a dangerous force already used by Beijing in plans to foment rebellions in Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam, etc. Large (more than 20 million ethnic Chinese are in Southeast Asia) and occupying important positions within the economies and administrative apparatus of some countries, this "underground army" is capable of committing economic sabotage in coordination with political disruption in order to incite rebellions.

The Maoist forces disguised as "revolutionary organizations" or "communist parties," that are organized, supported and commanded by Beijing are also a dangerous tool in the scheme of fomenting rebellions. The activities of the Maoist organizations in Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and so forth and of the organization called the "People's Army" in the Philippines have caused these countries to experience a nearly constant lack of security and stability for many years. During the past several years, the Beijing authorities have, on the one hand, been making every effort to court the governments of the ASEAN countries and, on the other hand, have publicly pledged to "absolutely support" these forces within the scope of "party to party relationships" for the purpose of exerting pressure and maintaining the ability to foment rebellions and topple governments when possible.

Beijing's network of spies and secret service agents, which extends throughout almost all of the countries of Southeast Asia and South Asia, has the task of organizing insurgent forces and the task of guiding rebellions. According to the western press, this network is divided by type of activity and region. It is under the command of such agencies as the Central Intelligence Department of the Chinese

People's Liberation Army, the Hoa Nam Intelligence Department, Southeast Asian Liberation Headquarters and so forth. In the activities of Beijing designed to foment rebellions, we generally see that the diplomatic agencies of China overseas, such as the embassies, consulates, commercial representatives, offices of the New China News Agency and so forth are local centers guiding and commanding rebellions.

The above mentioned forces are usually utilized by Beijing in a coordinated fashion depending upon the objectives, the situation and the course of development of rebellions in each country. Compared to the imperialists, Beijing has forces that the imperialists do not have for fomenting rebellions (such as the "underground army of ethnic Chinese," the Maoist organizations masquerading as revolutionary organizations and so forth).

3. The Coordination of Many Methods and Measures.

In order to foment rebellions, Beijing usually attaches importance to coordinating many political, economic and military methods and measures. This coordination involves the use of psychological warfare to provoke the masses into staging rebellions through acts of economic sabotage and the use of military pressure or a war of aggression in a vain attempt to rapidly create a state of confusion and instability in countries. Beijing's use of the "army of ethnic Chinese" to commit economic sabotage, create political confusion, foment rebellion and topple the government in Indonesia, its coordination of a war of aggression on the border with the fomenting of rebellions within the ethnic minority areas in northeast India, its use of pressure and threats of aggression along the border combined with acts of psychological warfare to provoke insurrections and a coup d'etat in Laos and so forth prove this fact.

Even within each type measure, Beijing generally coordinates many different methods. For example, economically, they generally use ethnic Chinese merchants to disrupt the market in coordination with economic embargoes from the outside. Militarily, they generally coordinate the intensification of armed activities by local insurgent forces with the intensification of provocation, military pressure and threats of a war of aggression. In the war of aggression against Vietnam in early 1979, Beijing planned to foment rebellions in the northern border provinces and even provoked ethnic Chinese and decadent elements in a vain attempt to foment rebellions in both Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City; however, they were tragically defeated.

Deserving of attention is the fact that Beijing attaches very much importance to provoking bigoted nationalism and sowing national hatred, especially in ethnic minority areas. Here, they usually employ lackeys and secret service agents in a psychological war waged by taking advantage of superstitions and using counter-propaganda to distort the policies of the local government. Recently, they have also employed at a number of places methods employed by the U.S. imperialists, such as sending in goods from China to bribe the people in ethnic minority areas and distributing psychological warfare "gifts" containing leaflets appealing to the people to overthrow the government.

In recent years, Beijing has also made efforts to use religions for subversive purposes. Many diplomatic agencies of China in the countries of Southeast Asia have made secret contacts with Buddhist, Catholic and Islamic organizations. Beijing's recent proclamation of support for the insurgent forces in the so called "Fraternal Islamic Organization" in a vain attempt to gain control over this forces in order to oppose the Afghanistan revolution is a typical example of this sinister scheme.

Exporting counter-revolution in order to foment rebellions is a malicious and very brazen measure that has been employed by Beijing. In the 1960's and the early 1970's, when the so called "great cultural revolution" was being accelerated throughout China, we noticed the emergence in many countries of Southeast Asia and South Asia of numerous organizations of overseas Chinese called "Red Guard" that engaged in activities against the laws, the system and the policies of the host countries, disrupted order and security and appealed for a coup d'etat. Today, although the rulers in Beijing have declared that the "cultural revolution" has ended, they have not abandoned their scheme of expanding and annexing other countries. For this reason, exporting counter-revolution is still a measure that Beijing will continue to employ.

4. Close Collaboration with the U.S. Imperialists in the Effort To Foment Counter-Revolutionary Rebellions

In recent years, years during which the leaders in Beijing have openly collaborated with the imperialists, especially the U.S. imperialists, with a view toward opposing the Soviet Union, Vietnam and the other socialist countries together with all revolutionary and progressive forces in the world, this collaboration has been clearly evident in the fomenting of rebellions overseas. Issue number 5 of the INFORMATION BULLETIN (July-August 1979) forthrightly stated that "according to reliable CIA sources, in his visit to Beijing in 1971, Kissinger laid the groundwork for an agreement to exchange strategic intelligence information with China." In subsequent years, "the Sino-American exchange agreements closely linked the clandestine intelligence activities of the United States...with the intelligence activities of China in Indochina." In the near future, "there will be more closely coordinated clandestine activities between China and the United States in Southeast Asia" and "the objective of these Sino-American activities will be to oppose the three revolutionary countries of Indochina." On 5 March 1978, the French newspaper THE NEW OBSERVER reported that China is planning to "revive the FULRO organization, a product of the U.S. spy network" to "foment rebellion against Vietnam." During the years that Beijing used the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary lackeys to wage a war of aggression against Vietnam on the southwestern border, there was much evidence of coordinated activities between Chinese secret service agents and lackey reactionary forces left behind by the United States in a vain attempt to foment rebellion in the provinces of South Vietnam. According to the western press, for nearly 1 year, Beijing and Washington have been closely collaborating in an effort to undermine the Afghanistan revolution by means of rebellions. Behind the so called "bilateral coordinated actions in the Afghanistan issue," we see that both Beijing and Washington have sent dollars, weapons and military "advisors" to strengthen the forces of the Afghanistan insurgents.

In this collaboration, they are in agreement with each other with regard to undermining and weakening revolutionary forces; at the same time, there are also antagonisms between them. As a result, it must be stated that this collaboration is very dangerous to the peace, security and stability of countries, especially in Southeast Asia.

As regards Beijing, in addition to the prime objective of opposing the revolution in the three countries of Indochina, they also want to use this collaboration to infiltrate the countries of Southeast Asia in a vain attempt to establish a foothold and strengthen the position of the pro-Beijing forces within the ASEAN countries, as they have done in Thailand.

All of the characteristics mentioned above show that, today, Beijing has truly become a center organizing and guiding all forces engaged in the fomenting of counter-revolutionary rebellions in Southeast Asia and South Asia. Clearly, Beijing's policy of expansion and hegemony and collaboration with the U.S. imperialists is the origin and the primary cause of the confusing situation and the threat to the peace and stability of this entire region.

However, the realities of several decades of defeat for Beijing in the scheme of fomenting rebellions in this region show that these strategic measures are not as effective as Beijing would like them to be. Despite this, the Beijing authorities are still frantically preparing for a war of aggression in coordination with intensifying the fomenting of rebellions.

Clearly aware of the enemy's scheme, our people and our armed forces are always alert and vigilant, are in a high state of combat readiness and are determined to defeat every malicious, insidious scheme of the enemy and successfully build and firmly protect the socialist Vietnamese fatherland. Beijing's scheme of fomenting counter-revolutionary rebellions and instigating wars of aggression shall surely be defeated.

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MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

FUNCTIONS OF BATTLEFIELD AIR FORCE OUTLINED

Hanoi TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN [PEOPLE'S ARMY REVIEW] in Vietnamese No 2, Feb 81
pp 39-49

[Article by Colonel Le Vien: "The Battlefield Air Force"]

[Text] Today, when a war to protect the fatherland breaks out, a campaign in which there is coordination among the modern branches and services will be a type of widely used campaign in warfare waged by main force military corps. The battlefield air force military corps is a form of organization and utilization of forces of the air force in order to participate in such campaigns.

The battlefield air force is a combat air force consisting of many different branches, such as the fighter branch, the fighter-bomber branch, the helicopter branch, the reconnaissance aircraft branch, the transport aircraft branch and so forth. The correct determination of the role, task and mode of utilization of the battlefield air force in campaigns in which there is coordination among the various branches and services makes a large contribution to achieving the combined strength of the main force military corps in a war to protect the fatherland.

In combat against the war of aggression waged by the Beijing reactionaries and their lackeys Pol Pot and Ieng Sary in the southwestern region of our country, the Southern Air Force, the function of which is to serve as a battlefield air force, began to achieve the offensive strength and mobility of the air force and basically completed the mission of controlling the air space, attacking ground and water targets, supporting command and transportation operations, supporting the mobility of forces and so forth, thereby helping to achieve the basic objectives of the various campaigns, especially the spring campaign in 1979. This article presents a number of experiences gained in the use of the battlefield air force in campaigns.

1. Making thorough, comprehensive and well coordinated preparations for campaigns and adopting a plan and norms that concentrate on the primary mission.

In the formulation of a campaign plan, it is of utmost importance to correctly establish the primary mission of the air force:

Generally speaking, each military corps of the air force has two basic missions when participating in a campaign: air defense combat operations and combat operations coordinated with the various branches and services. On the basis of the experience gained in fighting to protect the southwestern border, the southern air force realized that it was necessary to attach importance to the mission of providing direct combat support to the various combat branches and services. Correctly determining the primary mission of the air force on each front in each campaign is the basis for guiding the preparation of campaign forces and campaign training activities, organizing coordinated command operations and providing rear service and technical support consistent with the mission of the military corps. However, it must be realized that the air defense mission and the combined branches and services combat mission are closely related. Both of these missions have the purpose of competently supporting the various branches and services in the completion of their campaign mission. As a result, the Southern Air Force prepared the campaign for the correct direction, carefully prepared the various targets to be attacked on land and water and fulfilled the mission of the battlefield air force well.

Campaign preparations for the battlefield air force must be very well coordinated.

The success of the Southern Air Force in the formulation of its plan was that it gradually established norms that had to be met in the campaign: the basic mission that had to be completed; the primary targets that had to be destroyed; the mode of combat operations and the number of the various types of aircraft needed; the ratio among the various types of aircraft; the number of stationary and mobile troops that had to be supported during the campaign; the permanent and field air strips that had to be used or developed; the quantities of food, petroleum products and ammunition that had to be stockpiled; campaign attrition levels, etc. Although these norms were only projections, they did have the effect of giving the leaders of the various sectors, agencies and units a basis for making detailed calculations in each of their specialized areas.

The operations of the battlefield air force are operations that involve many elements of the service, many different objectives and combat coordination. For this reason, importance must be attached to making well coordinated preparations, both in the air and on the ground, in flight units and the agencies of flight units, at air force bases and command facilities and at the command posts coordinating with the various combined military corps. The commander of the battlefield air force must not only concern himself with a specific type of aircraft, but must also provide detailed guidance of preparations, methods of fighting, methods of combat operations, support operations and so forth for all of the types of aircraft within the formation. This is a factor that makes it possible to make optimum and highly efficient use of campaign air forces.

Campaign training must also be well coordinated. If fighter and bomber forces are well trained and well prepared for the campaign but the observer, reconnaissance and transport forces within the table of organization of the battlefield air force are not properly prepared, are not well coordinated in terms of their level of combat readiness and their ability to coordinate tactically with the bomber and fighter

forces, they will pose obstacles to the completion of missions by the other elements.

If importance is only attached to training in the air but attention is not given to training command staffs and support facilities, it is difficult to complete missions well. At air bases, the lack of thorough preparation in any aspect of the handling and loading of bombs and ammunition will more than slightly affect the efficiency of fighters and fighter-bombers in the performance of their mission.

Importance must also be attached to providing training in combat coordination among the various elements of the service, among the various types of aircraft within the air force and between the staffs and combined branches and services in order to achieve higher efficiency in the performance of campaign missions.

The training of the staffs that prepare the campaign must be coordinated with the task of formulating plans for and preparing command posts and ground facilities. The training of staffs must also be well coordinated so that the command posts on the upper level and the lower level are united in their actions and in agreement with one another.

There must be good training in air communications so that air forces can be commanded in a precise, rapid and firm manner; there must be good training in organizing coordinated communications in order to provide timely support of the various combined services; the command posts of the combined services must also give attention to selecting positions and creating the conditions for the establishment of air force command facilities in offensive campaigns. The air force itself must prepare a number of tables of organization of air force representation sections in advance in order to promptly perform the task of observing the offensive thrusts of the combined services.

In the comprehensive, well coordinated preparation of the command posts on the ground and in the air, the front command posts and the air force representation sections must receive uniform training in how to prepare basic command posts and the central command posts of the military corps. The basic command posts must be staffed with adequate personnel and have sufficient means to keep abreast of the situation on the various fronts and maintain close contact with the air force representation sections. Experience has shown that it is necessary to organize a command staff component in the air field duty area in order to rapidly assess every aspect of the situation of returning combat border units and flights and promptly disseminate information and intelligence to forces leaving for combat.

2. Knowing the basic objective of the campaign, the mission of each front, of each stage, of each key battle and the role of each target in battle.

Knowing the basic objective of the campaign is the basis for correctly determining combat strategy and correctly and creatively applying the tactics of the battlefield air force.

Experience has shown that wherever the basic objective of the campaign is not thoroughly understood, certain difficulties arise in leadership, in the organization

of command operations and in the specific combat operations of the border units and flights. Each campaign front, each stage of development and each battle in the campaign has different specific requirements; sometimes, these specific requirements are dependent upon how the commander of the combined military corps employs the air force. Therefore, in the process of gaining a thorough understanding of the basic objective of a campaign, it is necessary to gain a detailed understanding of the intentions of the commander on each front as well as during each stage and at each opportunity of decisive significance in the campaign. This is the basis for correctly determining how to use air forces, how to use each type aircraft in the various missions and the basis for selecting modes of combat operation designed to achieve high combat efficiency.

Correctly and rapidly determining the primary front in need of air support, determining air support priorities and resolutely concentrating air support on key battles are the valuable experiences that were gained by the Southern Battlefield Air Force.

In the fight against the Beijing reactionaries and their lackeys on the southwestern border, the battlefield air force had an advantage in its favor, namely, it was directly commanded and assigned its missions by the Ministry of National Defense. In order to carry out the missions and directives of the ministry, the forces of the battlefield air force were utilized in a rather concerted manner; at one time, more than one-third of these forces were used to carry out the primary mission. In view of the facts that the number of the various types of aircraft available was limited, there were very many specific missions and all of these missions had to be performed during the same time and over a very large area, this represented a major effort to implement the principle of centralizing forces for the purpose of carrying out the primary mission of the battlefield air force. Facts have shown that in combat operations that are coordinated among the various services and branches, both the army and the navy simultaneously have legitimate needs for air support in many different directions which require that the commander of the air force consult with the upper echelon in order to make truly efficient and economical use of air power. Sometimes, there is a true need to support both the army and the navy at the same time, to provide direct support to the combined military corps and conduct necessary independent air force operations at the same time as well as a need to make the secondary direction of attack the primary direction of attack. For this reason, rapidly determining air support priorities and resolutely centralizing the forces of the air force in order to support key battles demand that the battlefield air force commander be clear-sighted, flexible and determined in his decisions.

From its experience, the Southern Air Force learned to seize the opportunity, resolutely utilize its forces to deeply penetrate enemy territory and stage long-range attacks, quickly shift from one stage of combat to another and maintain continuous combat operations.

In a campaign, opportunities such as the following might arise: the enemy might be routed and flee, the enemy might draw back or shift to the defensive, the enemy

might launch a counter-attack or counter-offensive and so forth. It is necessary to promptly recognize these opportunities and be determined to employ the air force and take bold tactical measures.

After a period of combat, after examining the actual situation and after evaluating the air and air defense forces of the enemy, the commander of the battlefield air force raised the operational altitude of the attack aircraft flights in order to facilitate radar intelligence, facilitate air communications and broaden the scope of operation of aircraft, carry out the decision to deeply penetrate enemy territory and stage long-range attacks and support the combined military corps. The making of calculations to determine the best time for bomber forces to operate in view of the development of the campaign and determine the order of takeoffs and the rotation of aircraft as well as the targets to be attacked and assaulted under the condition of us controlling the air space increased the accuracy of the surprise attacks by the air force. These were examples of seizing opportunities in the campaign to increase the combat efficiency of the air force. In every campaign, depending upon the specific situation, the operations of the various services and branches shift from one stage to another, from offensive operations to temporarily maintaining positions, from heavy attacks to mop up operations, from temporary defensive operations to offensive operations, etc. In order for the air force to be independent in both its thinking and actions, it is necessary to predict the development of the situation and the missions and mode of operation of its border units, flight units and other forces. As regards combat operations in the process of shifting from one stage to another, the air force commander must first give thought to promptly providing guidance with regard to the methods of fighting to be employed, the scale of the utilization of forces and the methods to be employed in combat operations, must set forth a suitable plan for the use of weapons and so forth. These are the factors of decisive importance in insuring that the battlefield air force can always take the initiative in combat and constantly increase the combat efficiency with which it completes its missions in the course of development of the campaign.

In view of the conditions under which we operate, it is not enough for us to merely make concerted use of our forces in key battles, rather, we must also concentrate the use of our forces on primary targets and must hit the primary target within each group of targets.

Depending upon the specific objective of a battle, including key battles, different air support requirements might arise, such as attacking a seaport without hitting its warehouses, attacking an air field in order to paralyze its operations without damaging its runways or bridges in the course of the attack, attacking ferry landings without destroying ferryboats, etc. These are very high requirements throughout the entire course of a battle which air force combat border units must firmly grasp and which demand that these units overcome their difficulties in order to carry out the maneuvers involved in attacking targets and meet the requirements of the combined military corps. This is also an expression of the spirit of using the combat mission of the combined branches and services in battle, in a campaign, as the combat support objective of the battlefield air force, in particular, and the air force, in general.

The commander of the combined military corps must make known to the air force what the primary target within each group of targets is so that the various border units and flight units can attack them in a way that precisely meets the requirements of the combined military corps. The realities of combat have shown that the fighter-bomber forces of the air force were utilized rather well and that their use was rather highly concentrated on primary targets. In the spring campaign of 1979, 46 percent of the total number of the sorties flown by the border units and flight units of the air force were used to attack and destroy primary targets, such as enemy artillery positions, command posts, etc. However, what must be learned from this experience is that both the commander of the combined military corps and the air force commander are responsible for meeting this requirement.

As for themselves, the combat flight units and border units of the air force also must understand that launching concerted attacks means concentrating their attack on one target so that they do not disperse their firepower. They must be truly flexible and creative so that they hit the predetermined primary target with the highest possible offensive capability and the highest possible number of bombs. The effort to provide a thorough understanding of the basic objective of the campaign, the mission of each front and the mission in each stage and key battle and each target in battle must be carried out well within the basic units and among all troops participating in the campaign, especially with regard to the various party committee echelons and the commanders from the detachment to the military corps levels. In a campaign, it is necessary to quickly detect and correct anything that shows the lack of a thorough understanding of the basic objective of the campaign.

3. Making efficient, concerted use of one force after another in the primary mission, on the primary front and at primary opportunities; organizing large-scale annihilating attacks, direct hits on the target and continuous attacks better; and achieving the combined strength of the various forces in the tables of organization of the military corps.

Making efficient, concerted use of one force after another is a guideline and a method in the effective use of the air force. In a campaign, the air force generally operates over a large area, must coordinate its combat operations with many combined military corps, must support many fronts, carry out many missions and attack many targets. In view of the fact that the forces of the air force are limited, it is even more necessary for the commander of the battlefield air force to firmly adhere to the guideline of making concerted, efficient use of one force after another to attack primary targets.

To accomplish this, it is important to correctly establish the order of priority of the mission that the air force must perform and the targets to be attacked. It is necessary to comprehensively analyze the relationships among the various missions, targets and fronts. On this basis, the air force commander must determine on which mission and target he should concentrate his forces first and on which mission and target he should concentrate his forces later. In the course of a campaign, the air force commander's attention can still be distracted by requirements of the combined

military corps, the requirements of the air force representation sections on the various fronts and so forth, consequently, it is easy for the use of combat border units and flight units to become decentralized. To correct this situation, the battlefield air force commander must be both determined and patient in his evaluation and analysis of the situation and be able to skillfully organize and utilize his forces as calculated.

Raising the percentage of annihilating attacks and direct hits, achieving high efficiency in each battle and achieving high results from the entire campaign: the battles fought by the air force in areas B. and C., on S. Mountain, at K. River, at Wharf N. and in Ports X. and Z. were evaluated as highly efficient battles. These battles not only destroyed enemy forces and their weapons and storehouses, but also directly supported the combat activities of the combined military corps. However, there was also a small number of attacks on some targets in which many bombs were used but not with high efficiency. The requirement of a campaign is that the battlefield air force hit targets on the ground or water, hit the vital portions of targets, hit the positions requested by units.

Hitting the target is related to the economical use of forces, to making concerted use of one force after another against targets and to shifting support forces to other fronts. Because of inaccurate bombing that fails to destroy the target, a number of sorties must be flown to attack the target the next time or the next day; this makes it impossible to economize on forces or concentrate the use of forces on other missions. In actuality, there are some targets that the air force must attack several days in a row; in addition to the need to support the combined military corps, such attacks are also necessitated by inaccurate attacks on requested positions. Even the reports by combat pilots on the results of attacks on targets will, if inaccurate, affect the decision of the commander regarding the use of forces. For this reason, attention must be given to conducting reconnaissance operations before, during and after an attack in order to precisely determine the results of combat and decide how to use subsequent forces.

Another experience is that of fully utilizing the combined strength of the forces in the table of organization of the air force.

Each military corps within the air force has a certain number of personnel, aircraft and means and consists of many different branches. The problem faced is how to fully utilize the strength that lies within the table of organization of the military corps in the campaign. The Southern Air Force boldly assigned new pilots to fly together in combat and promptly reassigned pilots in order to utilize the various types of aircraft required by the campaign. The Southern Air Force also made it possible for all types of aircraft to employ many different methods in combat; they not only had to be proficient in attacking prepared targets, but also had to attack targets by voice command or search for and destroy targets on their own. Some aircraft were assigned additional missions and their method of operation was improved, thus further developing the offensive strength of the air force. The level of coordination was constantly raised and the support operations at bases, which quickly prepared for the next sortie, increased the intensity of combat of the border units

and flight units and multiplied the combined strength of the air force. As regards a mixed military corps within the air force, the full utilization of air and ground forces, command facilities and so forth for the purpose of achieving the combined strength of the unit represents the thorough implementation of combat guidelines and the art of utilizing forces.

4. Establishing a unified, centralized, well coordinated command, establishing an efficient relationship between centralized and decentralized commands, attaching importance to coordinating combat operations by target and time and closely coordinating combat support and the campaign.

In organizing coordinated combat operations, it is necessary to understand the fighting methods of coordinating units, give friendly units an understanding of the capabilities of the air force, the capabilities of each type of aircraft and correctly employ forces in a manner consistent with missions. In the realities of a campaign, the fighting methods of each corps in the army and navy are very flexible and diverse and are constantly changing and developing, sometimes involving attacks to breach enemy lines, sometimes involving mobile attacks, sometimes involving landings on beaches, etc. If the air force does not truly understand the formation, the fighting methods and the methods of operation of the military corps and the combined units, does not understand the difficulties of friendly units and does not understand the key opportunities for air support, it will be difficult for the air force to competently support the combined military corps. On the other hand, if the air force does not give friendly branches and services an understanding of its capabilities, the capabilities of each type of aircraft against each target and under various weather conditions, the method of assaulting targets of each type of aircraft and so forth, it could easily lead to demands for air support that are too high and to the use of air support in a manner that is not consistent with its missions or capabilities, thereby reducing its combat effectiveness and sometimes causing a lack of agreement regarding coordinating efforts.

Only by establishing a unified, centralized and well coordinated command with a clear division of responsibilities is it possible to increase the efficiency with which command operations are organized. Battlefield operations require a high level of combat readiness, close coordination in combat in terms of targets and timing, the simultaneous use of many elements of the service and continuous, intense combat operations. This demands that the air force command be unified, centralized and well coordinated and have a clear division of responsibilities. The deployment of many command centers (the basic command post, the forward command post, the front command posts, the air force representation sections, the air field command posts for command aircraft, transport aircraft and so forth) and the simultaneous deployment of hundreds of radios of all types are objective requirements of the battlefield air force. Therefore, it is necessary to unify and centralize every campaign command decision within the central command post so that it has the ability to firmly command all air and ground command centers and has the highest authority. The command on the air force corps level is, in actuality, the campaign command and determines the missions, the campaign fighting method, the utilization of forces, the selection of targets and so forth of the air force. The commands on the

air force detachment level lie within the scope of organization of takeoff and landing operations and the organization of the formation, the fighting methods and the specific flight routes for each target and objective.

In order for command operations to be stable and smoothly coordinated, importance must be attached to establishing coordination between the detachment command echelon and the military corps command echelon, especially with regard to organization, communications equipment and work procedures among the various command posts. An air force representation section that is observing operations on a front must also attach importance to coordination. However, if personnel are poorly qualified, if the quality of vehicles is poor, if there is an inadequate supply of air communications equipment and coordinated communications equipment or if there is a lack of maps or codes, it will be difficult to complete missions regardless of how operations are organized.

When many command echelons and command agencies are deployed, it is important to determine the role, mission and division of responsibilities of each echelon and clearly define the authority of each in order to create a unified, centralized command and insure that it fulfills the role intended for it. At the basic command post, the organization and division of labor should be such that it is possible to observe air to air combat missions, observe air attacks against ground or water targets, observe transport missions, make detailed situation reports and so forth as this is the only way to help the commander to keep abreast of the overall situation and keep abreast of a specific situation without overlooking any force, help the commander to closely observe the combat operations of each unit and closely manage the air space in which missions are being performed.

Importance must truly be attached to coordinating combat operations by target and time and establishing close coordination between combat support and the campaign.

Facts have shown that there is a need for very close coordination in terms of the time when aircraft appear in the area of operation in combat and the time when targets are attacked in support of the combined military corps. Attacks cannot be allowed to take place too early or too late. When aircraft arrive late and are slow to attack a stipulated target in coordinated operations, in addition to adversely affecting the performance of the mission, there is also a threat to the safety of both sides, especially the unit being supported. If aircraft arrive early and attack a stipulated target in coordinated operations early, the unit being supported cannot take advantage of the results of the attack and the enemy gains time to recover and mount a resistance. Therefore, close coordination in terms of timing is the responsibility of both the air force commander and the commander of a combined military corps.

When done properly, signals that distinguish us from the enemy in coordinated attacks on land or water targets help us to not miss an opportunity in combat and to provide good support, especially when the air force is operating on the basis of voice commands or destroying targets in search and destroy activities in mop up operations against the enemy.

The most notable progress made by the Southern Air Force was in organizing the direct support of the combined military corps in combat. The air force also learned to seize the opportunity to launch attacks on enemy forces when they were routed and fleeing in large groups. Thus, the battlefield air force competently fulfilled its mission of directly supporting the combined military corps in each battle and carried out attacks that affected the development of the entire campaign.

5. Comprehensively guiding combat support, rear services and technical support in a manner that truly meets campaign and tactical requirements and is consistent with the characteristics of the combat operations of the battlefield air force.

The various types of combat support, such as reconnoitering and guiding aircraft past air defense firepower, defending air fields, providing maps, guides and weather information, command signal operations, rescue operations, engineer work, rear service support and technical support, in the campaign conducted by the Southern Air Force provided many good experiences, the most significant one being the need for comprehensive, well coordinated guidance that meets requirements and is consistent with the characteristics of missions.

Above everything else, more importance must be attached to reconnaissance to assess the enemy situation and determine combat results in combat support operations. The battlefield air force must comprehensively assess the enemy's situation in the air as well as on the ground and water. In other words, it must assess the situation of the enemy air force, the deployment of air defense forces, the radar situation, the deployment of fighter and bomber forces, the deployment of air fields, fortifications and firepower, the location of command posts, artillery positions, seaport piers, ferry landings, areas of troop concentrations, campaign storehouses and so forth. This information is needed to prepare targets for our air force to attack.

It is necessary to utilize and collate available information well in order to assess the enemy's situation. Facts have shown that there is no shortage of sources of information in a campaign, rather, the problem lies in developing, analyzing and using information well: information from electronic reconnaissance, radar reconnaissance, photographic reconnaissance, observations by pilots and so forth to information provided by the air force military intelligence sections with the combined military corps.

The air force corps echelon must attach particular importance to organizing photographic reconnaissance and the observation of the ground from the air. When they return from each sortie, combat pilots bring back many observations made in combat and during their flight, such as the terrain in the combat zone and the fighting taking place at the target. Therefore, it is necessary to collect and collate this information well so that it can be rapidly disseminated to the border units performing subsequent missions as well as to the combined military corps. The reconnaissance of combat results by means of observer aircraft, photographic reconnaissance aircraft and fighter aircraft performing observation missions is essential in increasing the effectiveness of attacks.

Assessing the enemy's situation and gathering, analyzing and using information are not only the mission of the intelligence agency, but are also an important task of the air force commander. The commander must personally organize the reconnaissance of the enemy and collate and analyze information on the situation in order to lay the basis for making decisions and commanding combat operations.

An important experience is that of keeping abreast of campaign and tactical requirements and the characteristics of battlefield air force operations in order to increase the effectiveness of rear service support and technical support. A good guideline for campaign rear service support operations is to use an air field as the support center and to make combat forces the primary forces to be supported. The base air field is the place that embodies the various aspects of rear service operations, is the center in which guidance must be centralized and is the second battlefield of the entire air force. At an air field that has many different types of aircraft taking off and landing, it is necessary to properly organize deployment lines and combat support lines, from deploying the surface area of the support formation to organizing the lines that prepare bombs and ammunition. The base air field is also the forward command post of the air field rear service commander.

Preparing bombs and ammunition, organizing refueling operations for helicopters, organizing cargo handling areas, organizing the transportation of the wounded, resupplying air force units deep within newly liberated areas with food and so forth, which require an operation-size organization, support and escort operations and even air transport plans, are specific, necessary jobs. On a few fronts in the campaign, the tank trucks that refuel aircraft must be part of the organized formation of operation vehicles of the combined military corps in order to reach their destination safely.

The campaign rear service operations of the battlefield air force demand newer and more comprehensive guidance compared to air defense combat missions. There is a need for closer coordination between the rear service line of the branch and the rear service line of the air force. Rear service operations do not stop at the concept of support, but must also have a command impact in the area of rear services. The rear service agency must be the rear service command of the air force commander.

Providing technical support to the majority of the types of aircraft in a campaign, which involves a very large effort on the part of the air force technical sector, and insuring that the number of aircraft in continuous operation does not fall below the stipulated level are good experiences that have been gained in technical work. This work consists of a number of measures involving periodic maintenance, the classification of equipment, the creation of sources of equipment, the production and improvement of components, warehouse inventories, the research of inventions and so forth before and during the campaign.

Packaging commonly used equipment and components so that they can be easily transported to the front in mobile combat operations in order to promptly repair aircraft is another good experience gained by the technical sector. Guiding technical improvements so

that they meet the tactical requirements of each type aircraft also yielded many results. The close coordination of the technical support line of the branch and that of the air force in the South created tremendous technical support capabilities.

Although there are still some problems in need of additional, deeper research, the above mentioned experiences of the battlefield air force on the southwestern border are highly valuable experiences not only for combat operations, but also for the buildup and training of the battlefield air force in a war to protect the fatherland.

7809

CSO: 4209/358

MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

COMBATANTS RECEIVE PROPER TREATMENT AT END OF DRAFT

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 6 Jun 81 p 1

[Article: "Properly Implementing Policy Toward Combatants Having Fulfilled Military Obligation"]

[Text] Phu Khanh Province satisfactorily welcomed more than 400 cadres and combatants who had fulfilled their military obligation and now returned to help build the locality. The military commander let them know thoroughly the present situation and immediate and long-term tasks of the province. The professional organs took good care of their interests in full compliance with the policy of the party and state. The sectors and local areas made arrangements to give them jobs suitable for the occupation they had been trained in in the army. Nearly 40 cadres and combatants who had made good achievements in combat and productive labor received training to become reserve officers and to serve as the hard core for building the militia and self-defense force.

Carrying out the directive on organizing military recruitment in 1981, the Special Operations Service Command had a plan for providing leadership to make the units and organs in charge of policies, war supplies and financial affairs get prepared in every way and do this work properly. The organ in charge of organization and mobilization completed its statistical work by dividing each batch of new recruits on the basis of both quantity and quality, selecting people for training to become reserve officers or for taking college examination or vocational training and sending cadres to local military organs to discuss welcoming the combatants who were returning after having fulfilled their obligation. All units considered the cases of commendation and awards and positively made public the policies regarding these combatants. Many commanders came to actually meet and exchange ideas with each of these combatants about the strengths and weaknesses they had known while being in the army.

After having fulfilled their obligation in the army, many troops of the armored force volunteered to go to help build new economic zones. Vehicle operators and mechanics signed up for work in motorized units to suit their capabilities. The

command of the service gave orders to units in charge of registration to find the combatants who had acquired good professional and specialized capabilities and to let them return to local areas to help manage the reserve force.

Gia Dinh Regiment of Ho Chi Minh City took good care of the interests of 469 military draftees who had fulfilled their obligation. Seventeen wards and districts had full lists of them, registered them as new households and made arrangements to give them jobs. The military supplies and equipment organ delivered enough grain for 6 months' consumption to the ward and district grain supply offices. The combatants who did not receive military uniforms in 1981 were permitted to buy at supply prices cotton materials to make new clothes for themselves.

5598

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MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

TIEN GIANG MILITIA, SELF-DEFENSE FORCES UNDERGO MILITARY TRAINING

Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 12 Jun 81 p 1

[Article by Quang Khanh: "Tien Giang Provincial Military Organ Raises Combat Standard of Militia and Self-Defense Forces"]

[Text] In view of the topographic characteristics and production seasons of the province, the Tien Giang provincial military command has studied and organized a more rational military training within a reasonable concentration period in order to achieve good results from training without impeding the local production schedule.

Village and subward cadres have attended the training courses, firmly grasped two forms of tactics and practiced shooting with live ammunition in taking lesson 1 in the use of AR-15 rifles.

Over the past year, 100 percent of the total number of militia and self-defense men in 8 subwards and 5 villages subordinate to My Tho City have undergone training. Their units have adequately organized patrols and guards and maintained order and security in their respective localities.

In a number of coastal villages, militiamen have closely cooperated with the border defense troops in patrolling and keeping watch to prevent bad elements from fleeing abroad or infiltrating illegally.

Recently, the provincial military organ organized joint maneuvers by the coastal village militia and the border defense troops with the objective of defeating the enemy on the spot in case he violates the coastal areas of our country. Following these maneuvers, the militia units in coastal villages have further heightened their standard of combat readiness and cooperation with the border defense troops.

9332

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MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

SECURITY MEASURES TIGHTENED IN VINH CITY

Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 12 Jun 81 p 2

[Article by Duong Thanh Tung: "Vinh City Steps Up Maintenance of Security"]

[Text] Since mid-1980, the military and public security forces, neighborhood protection sections, village public security sections and militia and self-defense forces in Vinh City have simultaneously deployed their units to clear the area, to hunt out the criminals' dens, to arrest many gangs of ruffians, to promptly punish snatch-and-run hoodlums and to fight and eliminate many groups of persons intent on causing local political disturbances.

Army and public security units have assigned cadres and combatants to villages, subwards, organs, enterprises and schools to motivate the masses to build and strengthen a security and national defense network. Vinh City has satisfactorily strengthened village public security sections and neighborhood, organ and enterprise protection sections and has consolidated and developed thousands of cells in charge of maintaining security for the people and ensuring safety in various organs. "Red Banner" youth units and "Blue Birds" teenagers units have acted in conjunction with hundreds of fire-fighting and people's protection units and proven effective in carrying out regular patrols and inspections to defend the socialist property and the people's wealth. The entire city has begun to strictly implement regulations to build a civilized life style.

9332

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MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

FOOD PRODUCTION BY HAU GIANG TROOPS DESCRIBED

Hanoi TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN [PEOPLE'S ARMY REVIEW] in Vietnamese No 2, Feb 81 pp 63-69

[Article by Senior Colonel Ngo Duc Nhuong: "The Troops of Hau Giang Develop Upon the Strengths of the Locality and Actively Produce Grain and Food Products"]

[Text] Hau Giang is a province in the Mekong River Delta that consists of the former areas of Can Tho and Soc Trang. With its arable land, its rivers and streams and the conditions with which it has been blessed by nature, Hau Giang has long been a province with much potential in agriculture. This strength of the locality has been an important factor helping the troops of Hau Giang to produce grain and food products over the past several years, which they have been doing with marked results and increasing progress.

In 1979 alone, the local army units of Hau Giang harvested 1,536 tons of rice. After deducting 130 tons to pay agricultural taxes, 167 tons for seed and 210 tons to pay for production costs, they still had 1,029 tons to serve as a grain source for the units of the province, which were incorporated in the upper level to lower level supply standard. Also in 1979, the livestock herds and poultry flocks of the units of the province numbered 115 buffalo and head of cattle, 557 hogs of various types and 2,796 chickens and ducks. Some 71,000 fish were released.

The above were the results that were achieved during a period of time in which the majority of the province's units had been sent to the front to maintain combat readiness and engage in combat. Of course, these results originated, to an important degree, in the projects prepared in previous years by units performing economic work and by the armed forces of the province. However, these results also indicate the thorough understanding that the troops of Hau Giang have of the resolutions and policies of the Party Central Committee concerning agriculture, in general, and the production of grain and food products, in particular; they reflect tremendous efforts on the part of cadres and soldiers. Developing upon the inherent strengths of the locality in order to produce grain and food products has become a living lesson to the troop units of Hau Giang. Facts have shown that this practice not only makes it possible to create significant sources of grain and food products in order to reduce the contributions made by the people, reduce the transportation of these products from the central level and improve the meals of cadres and soldiers,

but also makes it possible to eventually establish stockpiles and create local sources of materials for local and national defense military rear services within the locality.

1. The troops of Hau Giang have engaged in analysis and gained a thorough understanding of the strength of their locality in order to utilize it well.

A workforce of 800,000 laborers is a significant workforce and more than 400,000 hectares of farmland in the Mekong River Delta are a precious asset to a province. Abundant sunlight, much rainfall and a moderate atmosphere together with the systems of canals and ditches that were established long ago and have been strengthened and developed for many years are important conditions that provide additional advantages for crops and cause the crops of Hau Giang to mature rapidly. All of these characteristics and conditions combine to form the strength of the province. The locality's strength in agriculture also lies in the machine network and the local machine capabilities that support crop production; the strength of the locality also lies in the tradition, habits and experiences of its farmers. Thus, it can be said that the strength of Military Region 9 in agriculture is primarily the strength of each province and within each province.

However, facts show that not all of the areas or places within the provinces of the military region or within Hau Giang share this strength equally. The geo-economic position, military position, soil structure and water sources vary from area to area. Although they do not constitute the majority of the total farmland of the province, areas of saline soil and alkaline water, areas that are waterlogged or dry due to inadequate water conservancy projects and areas that have lain fallow since the resistance against the United States are not few in number. Field work in these areas obviously poses many unavoidable difficulties. Therefore, if, in the face of the strength of the province, each unit only prepared itself to deal with advantages and only viewed these advantages in a general fashion, they could very easily encounter difficulties and suffer setbacks.

On the basis of thoroughly analyzing the strength of the locality, one matter was decided upon by the troops of Hau Giang: to be ready to go to the places of greatest difficulty and successfully raise rice, even in areas of saline soil, waterlogged areas, arid areas and fallow areas; and to develop the production of subsidiary food crops and expand livestock production on the basis of solving the grain problem through rice production. Although they faced difficulties, these difficulties were difficulties of and within the strength of the province. In the resistance against the United States, the army and people of the entire military region as well as those within each province united as one, overcame countless sacrifices and hardships, displayed self-reliance and clung to their land and fields in order to struggle with the enemy and carry out production, thereby creating local sources of supplies so that the people and troops could fight the enemy. Today, with the complete dictatorship of the proletariat system that extends from the central level to the local level and the installations and in our position as masters of the country, masters of society, we have many new conditions and new, tremendous capabilities. By developing upon their fine traditions and making full

use of the new conditions and capabilities that exist, the army and people of Hau Giang Province are fully capable of overcoming their difficulties and obstacles and using the locality's strength in agriculture to accelerate production and build the economy so that not one bit of soil lies fallow.

When these correct attitudes permeated the cadres and soldiers of Hau Giang, they created material strength and led to positive revolutionary actions within units. For this reason, in 1976, when the task of opening new land and restoring fallow fields was started, many comrades at first became discouraged and negative because they felt as though they were returning to the hard days and months spent exposed to the elements during the war of resistance; however, they later changed their attitude and actively participated in production. After these initial problems were overcome, the work of opening new land and restoring fallow fields gradually became a voluntary movement on the part of the masses, became the responsibility and the source of honor of every cadre and soldier. By the end of 1977, more than 7,000 hectares had been opened or restored to the cultivation of rice. In view of the climatic conditions, the rivers, the manpower and the tradition of Hau Giang, this land, once it has been cultivated well, will make a positive contribution to the effort to develop upon the strength of the locality in the field of agricultural production.

As a result of correctly understanding the inherent strength of their locality, the troops of Hau Giang have also gradually linked the production of grain and food products to the creation of sources of materials to provide rear services in the immediate future and over the long range and to the effort to strengthen the national defense system within the locality.

At the very outset, areas Q. X., K. and H. were established as bases for building state farms and as areas for preparing battlefields and maintaining combat readiness. The production groups within these four areas are forces that clear new land, restore fallow fields, build water conservancy projects, construct fields and plant rice as well as units that are permanently stationed in the locality and create a firm, permanent footing for maintaining security, protecting the locality and protecting the fatherland. In order to make the province a strategic unit as well as competently reinforce the frontline, Hau Giang must prepare sources of manpower in well organized units and sources of materiel consisting of large quantities of grain, food products and medicine. Over the past 2 years, the Hau Giang military sector has sent soldiers to be trained and the tons of rice produced by them have been sent to the front. Because the level of grain production has constantly been increasing, the troops of Hau Giang have been able to put hundreds of tons of rice into mobile grain stockpiles. This has not only created a position of self-sufficiency in grain for the military activities within the area of operation of the province, but also enabled troop participation in the grain front of the locality, thereby reducing the difficulties of the state.

2. On the basis of gaining a thorough understanding of the strength of the locality, the troops of Hau Giang attached importance to selecting suitable steps to take in order to develop upon this strength.

These steps first had to be consistent with the political and military tasks of the province and of the armed forces within it as well as consistent with the requirements of economic construction, of the strengthening of the national defense system within the locality and the country in both the immediate and long-range situations. These steps must also be closely linked to the present situation and the prospects in the near future for supplying materials to troops on the various battlefields and in the various localities. In actuality, over the past several years, Hau Giang has not only had to concern itself with building and strengthening its rear lines in various ways, but also had to concern itself with providing material and technical support to its combat units on the frontline. The military rear services of the rear line, the basic line of the province must competently support the rear services on the frontline and give priority to distributing supplies to frontline units.

For this reason, the selection of suitable steps demands thorough, detailed calculations. Calculations must be made for each agency, each unit, each person, for each vehicle, machine, liter of gasoline, liter of oil, each hoe and shovel; it is necessary to clearly analyze and make calculations concerning each area, each piece of land, each natural condition and each existing capability. Only in this way is it possible to make accurate decisions concerning the scale and form of production, the allocation of crops and livestock, plans for the seasons, for the mobilization of labor, means, vehicles, machinery, etc.

Only in this way is it possible to see what can be accomplished and determine the order in which jobs should be done in order to develop upon the locality's strength.

Regardless of how large a locality's strength might be, it cannot, by itself, yield practical returns. Regardless of how enthused or confident persons might be in a strength and regardless of how correct their motive might be, these factors do not, of themselves, yield returns in economic work. Therefore, even when a strength is understood, in order to develop upon it, to produce rice, hogs, chickens and so forth, it is still necessary to engage in analysis and make calculations. In the face of the impressive strength of their locality, analysis and calculations have helped the troops of Hau Giang, to an important degree, to avoid being impetuous, avoid wanting to achieve large-scale operations and earn large profits at the very outset as well as combat the phenomenon of procrastination and hesitancy.

In actuality, the calculations and plans of the troops of Hau Giang for raising grain and food products were not perfected all at once, rather, they were gradually formed and supplemented and gradually perfected through many different stages. However, of decisive significance is the fact that these calculations and plans have been consistent with the actual situation of the locality in keeping with the guidance of the central level and the upper level, thereby insuring correctness from the first stage.

As early as 1976, the province boldly sent forces to open new land and restore fallow fields in area Q., thereby creating a stable production area for the province. At the same time, the province expanded the small-scale, scattered production of the

provincial, district and city military agencies. This reality existed as coordination and mutual support between centralized and decentralized production, between nucleus forces and widespread forces, between the province and the district, between the general and the specific and between large-scale and small-scale production.

At the centralized production installation managed by the units specializing in economic work, efforts were first focused on opening new land and restoring fallow fields in order to achieve the norm on the amount of arable land; then, water conservancy projects were constructed and one rice crop per year was grown; in this way, they have gained experience and gradually built the installation in every respect in order to turn it into a state farm. During the past 2 years, due to the requirements of the combat task, this installation has been operated by forces based on a stipulated percentage of the province's troop strength. The installation's farmland is only being maintained at one-fourth the original amount of farmland worked by the installation. However, the harvest from this farmland still constitutes the largest percentage of the total annual rice output produced by the troops of Hau Giang.

On the scattered production fields of the units, districts and cities, the effort to make full use of local capabilities has been both universal and comprehensive, encompassing everything from the opening of new land, the restoration of fallow fields and the borrowing of land of citizens to work rotation and work exchange with citizens, renting and borrowing mechanized equipment from the locality and so forth. On these fields, even in the process of trying to raise one good crop per year, the various districts and cities have, on the basis of their arable land, water conservancy and other conditions within the locality, quickly begun raising two crops on certain fields, quickly linked the production of subsidiary food crops to the production of rice and quickly linked livestock production to crop production. As a result, the district and city military agencies have contributed a significant portion of the total product produced by the troops of Hau Giang. This contribution plus the large harvest of the centralized production agency, which amount to thousands of tons of grain per year, prove the correctness of the province's calculations and stages of development, namely, concentrating first on the production of rice and, on the basis of rice production, expanding crop production and coordinating the various scales and forms of production in order to develop the strength of the locality in grain and food product production.

Moving forward on the basis of rice production, the troops of Hau Giang prepared the necessary conditions and gradually created a balance between crop production and livestock production. Together with the cattle, hogs, chickens and ducks raised in the districts and cities, a centralized hog farm of the province was established in late 1977 and has been developed along the lines of using short-term crops to raise long-term crops and gradually advancing from small scale to medium and large scale. At first, the farm only had one row of pens with 80 hogs consisting of 3 boars, 40 sows and 37 meat hogs. In 1978 and 1979, the farm was expanded to three rows of pens and, in September 1980, the farm had 515 hogs of many different types and ages. The quantity of meat supplied by the farm to the troops and several agencies within the province has risen to more than 17,000 kilograms. The initial results of the hog farm not only confirm the efforts made by the collective of cadres, soldiers and

personnel at the farm, but also indicate how well the tremendous potentials of the locality as well as the troops of Hau Giang have been developed once correct calculations were made and correct steps were taken.

3. In the gradual advance of the production process, the troops of Hau Giang have also taken positive steps to improve their management and work methods in order to achieve practical economic returns.

To begin with, it was necessary to improve work methods in the areas of leadership and command activities. Work methods had to be improved in both the formulation of policies and plans and in specific daily actions. Work methods must be such that they insure uniformity from top to bottom, involve investigations, research, management, inspections and close coordination, make it possible to employ the strength of military organization and are consistent with economic activities.

To insure uniformity of thought and action from top to bottom, the Hau Giang military command as well as the rear service agency and production agency of the province have always sought the leadership and guidance of the provincial party committee and the military agency on the upper level. Every resolution and policy regarding economic construction, agricultural production, the use of troops to produce grain and food products and so forth has been rapidly disseminated to and thoroughly understood by the cadres and soldiers of the various units, districts and cities. The provincial party committee has led the military sector in all of the jobs involved in opening new land, restoring fallow fields and producing grain and food products; it has guided the various sectors in the province in helping troops with capital, seeds, technology, etc. Under the leadership of the Military Region Party Committee, the Rear Service Department and the production agency of Military Region 9 have displayed greater responsibility in guiding the province in the areas of organization and plans and have helped the province with materials and technology. Within the provincial military command as well as each district and city military agency, there is one deputy commander who specializes in observing and directly guiding the production carried out by troops. A deputy commander in charge of rear services within the provincial military command personally serves as commander of the centralized production installation of the province. As a result, uniformity has been rapidly established not only in policies and plans, but in actions as well. The effectiveness of this uniformity has been proven by the change that has been brought about in the outlook and thinking of troops in the face of the new requirements of the revolution, especially when they first began producing grain and food products and when the situation and task changed, thus making it necessary to readjust the organization, forces and scale of production. Only as a result of this uniformity has it been possible to mobilize and organize the mass of units and the members of the local army units of the province to overcome every difficulty and shortage and make every effort to use each piece of land, each section of river and each condition with which the locality has been blessed in production.

Uniformity in leadership and guidance always demands a workstyle based on investigations and research. As a result of conducting investigations and research, we have come to see the potentials of the entire province and the capabilities of each area; see our overall strength and specific limitations; see which jobs need to be performed and

which jobs need not be performed; see which jobs should be performed now and which should be performed later; see the advantages that we have in order to make full use of them and see our difficulties in order to overcome them, thereby insuring that we are always in the position of being the masters of nature, the masters of our work. Economic activities not only take the form of policies and plans, but also include countless small, almost trivial, jobs that are closely linked to the daily lives of millions of persons. Only through investigations and research have the troops of Hau Giang been able to uncover antagonisms, raise and resolve questions correctly and deal with both difficulties and advantages exactly as they are without distorting or exaggerating them.

Production also demands good management and good inspections. At first, the troops of Hau Giang lacked many items and were unfamiliar with the environment in which they were working. If the upper level did not conduct inspections, did not maintain close contact with the lower level and with soldiers, it would seem that everything posed an inescapable difficulty or obstacle. In the recent period, work has been put on a regular basis, production has increased and, although not many products are being produced, there are products for both consumption and storage. At this time, a lack of management and inspections would easily lead to false reports, to the concealment of output for private consumption, to the use of grain in a manner that violates regulations and ration standards, to the unplanned production of livestock and poultry and to the loss of tools, gasoline and oil and the breakdown of machinery for no legitimate reason and for which no one is responsible. And, of course, when this occurs, even if grain and food products are produced, economic returns are not a certainty.

Economic activities also demand the same unity and coordination found in military activities. The troops of Hau Giang have sold to the livestock feed corporation of the province hundreds of hogs, have supplied the military region with dozens of tons of rice seed and have loaned to Minh Hai Province 100,000 dong in capital supplied by the upper level so that Minh Hai could overcome the aftereffects of natural disasters. Conversely, the troops of Hau Giang have been supplied with fertilizer, seed, capital and technology by friendly sectors and units and by the upper level. As a result of this unity and coordination, the troops of Hau Giang have established mutual help between themselves and the people, between the army and the various sectors of the economy, between the upper level and the lower level, between their locality and neighboring localities; in this way, they have created additional conditions for developing upon their advantages, overcoming their difficulties, increasing their production capacity and making full use of the province's strength in the production of grain and food products.

The troops of Hau Giang have recorded encouraging results in the production of grain and food products and have laid the necessary foundation for future years. The strength of the locality on the agricultural production front has been partially developed. However, there are still limitations and shortcomings. In the years ahead, with the organizational stability that has been established and the stability of the agricultural production task, with the experiences that have been gained and by improving their work and production skills, the troops of Hau Giang will surely record even better achievements.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, TRADE AND AID

FIVE-YEAR TRADE AGREEMENT SIGNED WITH USSR

OW312032 Moscow Radio in Vientiane to Vietnam 1000 GMT 31 Jul 81

[Text] Following their talks, the Soviet and SRV Governments' trade delegations on 30 July signed in Moscow a commodity exchange and payments agreement for the current 1981-85 5-year plan.

Soviet Foreign Trade Minister Patolichev and Le Khac, his Vietnamese counterpart, signed the agreement. Also present at the signing ceremony was SRV Ambassador to the Soviet Union Nguyen Huu Mai.

The following is our station observer's report on the agreement.

This is one of the Soviet-Vietnamese agreements signed in Moscow in July. The previous ones dealt with Soviet-Vietnamese cooperation in the cultural, scientific, economic, and technical fields. The new agreement is another important document. It concerns the volume of goods exchanged between the two countries.

Compared with the previous 5-year plan, the volume of goods exchanged in the current 5-year plan will increase by nearly 90 percent. The Soviet Union will substantially increase volume of essential goods provided to Vietnam such as oil products, automobiles, metals and road building machinery. The volume of fertilizer will more than triple and metal will more than double. Cotton supplies will increase by 70 percent.

For its part, Vietnam will continue to increase its regular export goods to the Soviet Union such as rubber, coffee, spices, lumber and fine arts products.

The increase in the volume of commodities exchanged between our two countries is a result of the continuing development and consolidation of friendship between our two countries and peoples, of the perfecting of the procedures in Soviet-Vietnamese economic and trading cooperation. Past experience shows that trading on the basis of equality and mutual interests has effectively promoted the building of socialism and communism in our two countries. It is consistent with the spirit of fraternity reflected in the USSR-Vietnam friendship and cooperation treaty, which Comrade Brezhnev, in his speech at the 26th CPSU Congress, called a realistic example of socialist internationalism.

Of course, in order to satisfactorily carry out the newly signed trade agreement and the other agreements, millions of Soviet and Vietnamese workers must persevere in their work. The Soviet people, who have always considered their assistance to Vietnam as a dictate of their hearts and their minds, are determined to satisfactorily implement the new agreements.

PARTY ACTIVITIES AND GOVERNMENT

MEDICAL TOOLS, EQUIPMENT CORPORATION DIRECTOR FIRED

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 5 Jun 81 p 4

[Article: "Director of Medical Tools and Equipment Corporation Fired"]

[Text] In its issues of 28 May and 3 June 1981 NHAN DAN printed the opinions of readers about the director of Medical Tools and Equipment and Grade 1 Test Chemicals Corporation of the Department of Materials (Ministry of Public Health) who had had the policy of using scalpels and razors "to distribute within the corporation" and permitting "husband provides protection, wife is warehouse keeper." After having checked into what the two articles had revealed, the Minister of Public Health signed an order to fire the director of the corporation, to appoint a deputy chief of the Department of Materials (Ministry of Public Health) to replace him and to name a new deputy director to complete the leadership of the corporation. He also ordered the recall of the scalpels, razors and medical tools that had been "distributed within the corporation" and informed all public health units and installations in the sector of the need to draw some experience from this incident. This decision has been made public.

There has been a suggestion to the effect that a control team should be set up to fully investigate this incident.

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ECONOMIC PLANNING, TRADE AND FINANCE

HANOI, HAIPHONG IMPROVE DISTRIBUTION, MARKET MANAGEMENT

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 5 Jun 81 p 1

[Article: "Improving Purchase and Distribution of Vegetables in Hanoi, Market Management in Haiphong"]

[Text] Implementing the Political Bureau resolution on distribution and circulation, with an aim at gradually stabilizing the living conditions of cadres, workers and civil servants, the Hanoi VCP Standing Committee has recently decided to take new urgent measures.

In the production, purchase and distribution of vegetables in Hanoi, there were many efforts but supply was far from regular and quality was not guaranteed. The lack of proper interest in the vegetables-growing zones was reflected in these facts: the quantities and time of delivery of grain, fuels and other necessary goods were not guaranteed; the capital invested in the building of the material and technical base for such zones was far from sufficient, etc.

To get enough vegetables for the municipality, in addition to planning anew the use of land for intensive cultivation and increase of yield, the vegetables-growing zones in the cities of Son Tay and Xuan Hoa will be expanded and more cooperatives specialized in growing vegetables will be established in Dan Phuong and Hoai Duc Districts. There will be a switch to the formula of exchange for grain for the vegetables-growing zones and for nitrate fertilizer for the seasonal vegetables-growing zones. The purchase prices of some varieties of vegetables will be raised during the summer-autumn season and adjusted during the winter-spring season to ensure reasonable prices that will be an encouragement for producers. The municipality sells vegetables at commercial prices to those workers whose wages already include price differences or allowances. It maintains supply balance by securing quantities of vegetables, which are transported by both motorized vehicles and rudimentary means; sets rational freight rates; and sells means of transportation and replacement parts to the cooperatives in charge of transporting vegetables to the retail counters. Districts are to draft plans for producing vegetables to sell to the urban wards, to sign and carry out two-way economic

contracts with vegetables-growing production installations and to organize retail sales of vegetables to organs and units within the districts. The Hanoi Vegetables and Fruits Corporation is to strengthen its system of purchase and distribution and to make preparations for assigning early the task of managing, distributing and retailing vegetables to wards and subwards.

The corporation both steps up the purchase of vegetables and extends the network of transportation by rudimentary means in the three wards adjacent to the urban wards and in Tu Liem and Thanh Tri Districts and urges the cooperatives to carry vegetables straight to the retail locations. It signs transportation contracts with the Red River and October pedicab cooperatives in Hoan Kiem Ward and the Goods Transportation Corporation of the municipality, coordinates the two-way rental of vehicles by organs and army units within the municipality and at the same time improves the working method adopted by the corporation's fleet. It organizes the operations of the fleet in shifts and maintains on a regular basis 20 vehicles for transporting 80-120 tons of vegetables a day. In May the quantities of vegetables purchased were twice as large as those in the same month last year. The corporation takes additional measures to purchase and control the sources of vegetables.

The Municipal VCP and People's Committees of Haiphong have been concentrating their leadership on stepping up production; carrying out procedures about delivery of products, financial management and balance between money and goods; and improving the method of distribution. Adjustment of allowances has been made temporarily for those who now work for wages in the state sector. Such sectors as finance, banking, commerce, prices, labor, etc. have been providing guidance for production installations to quickly develop their regular work. Production and commercial business units have made inventories to know the amounts of goods they had in stock as of 31 May and maintain profit-and-loss accounting separately for each line of goods.

The municipality is concentrating its efforts on stepping up purchases and reorganizing the sales network to make it more appropriate. Industrial production installations are checking into their implementing the Council of Ministers' directives and ensuring the obligation to deliver products to the state. As to grain and foods, after the obligation quotas have been filled, the remaining products, if need be, will be sold by the cooperatives on a priority basis to the commercial sector at fixed prices under the guidance of the Municipal Price Committee. The sales network is being reorganized to become two separate ones.

About market management, the financial and commercial reform committees of wards, districts and the municipality are checking into the number of small business people, issuing business registration papers, posting prices and paying taxes. Subwards are establishing consumer cooperatives. Districts are setting up retail counters in Sat Market for regular business. In the concentrated business locations, cases of violations of regulations are checked and handled. Speculation and hoarding and all illegal transactions are severely punished.

ECONOMIC PLANNING, TRADE AND FINANCE

EDITORIAL URGES DISCIPLINE TO STABILIZE ECONOMIC ORDER

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 5 Jun 81 p 1

[Editorial: "Discipline in Production-Business"]

[Text] On the basis of the system of socialist collective ownership of the working people at all of the basic levels (basic, local and central) and a full understanding of the principle of democratic centralism in economic management, our party affirms that managing the economy as it moves from the small-scale production to the socialist large-scale production requires a strengthening of leadership and of unified centralized management, on that basis an extension of the right to have initiative in production-business and a full and broad development of the capabilities and talents of all sectors, echelons and production installations. This is a managerial formula that both complies with the regulations and is suitable for the real situation of our country as it is aimed at making the economic managerial system truly efficient and brings about great results in the construction of our socialist economy.

To ensure the right to have centralized management and to extend the right to have initiative in the economic activities of all sectors and echelons are two aspects that are unified. Both aspects act simultaneously in the entire economic managerial system from the central to basic level and are seen in all fields of production, distribution, circulation and consumption. The centralized leadership and management we mention here are different from the all-level bureaucratic administrative management which we are abolishing. To achieve the right of localities and production installations to have initiative in production and business is not to organize economic activities in a divisive manner. To extend a right always goes hand in hand with emphasizing obligation and responsibilities.

By correctly implementing new resolutions and policies, many localities and production installations have made initial progress in making management orderly and creating a new situation in production, distribution and circulation. The restrictions imposed by the all-level bureaucratic administrative management have

been destroyed for the first time. The right to have initiative in production and business and the right of production installations to be financially self-ruled are gradually being established. However, in some localities there appeared incorrect ways of thinking and working. The echelons that held the leadership and management functions failed to uphold their own concentrated power and still neglected management in regard to the major activities of the lower echelons. Plans both were ineffective and failed to awaken the great potential capabilities of the localities and production installations. The lower echelons, including the people who work in the basic economic units, did not show much initiative in fulfilling their production and business task, nor did they guarantee the interests of the state; many management policies and procedures were not respected properly. Not only did these deviations weaken the centralized management role of the state but they also had adverse effects on the economic activities and interests of all units and working people.

To continue implementing Decisions Nos 25 and 26-CP of the Council of Ministers requires that the entire managerial system from top to bottom on the one hand ensure the effectiveness of centralized management and, on the other, fully and correctly develop the right of sectors and echelons to have initiative in economic activities, for the purpose of exploiting in the best manner its own capabilities so as to fulfill the tasks of the state plan.

The strength of unified centralized management first of all is guaranteed by unity of mind, organization and action in correctly implementing the policies and procedures currently in effect. The use of the goods-money and market relationships must be based on guaranteeing fulfillment of the state plan and guaranteeing the unified relationship among the interests of the state, collectives and individuals.

To correctly develop their right to have initiative in economic activities, localities and production installations must adopt the appropriate forms and measures of organization of management, achieve ownership in production and business on the basis of properly carrying out the legal goals of their plans and fulfilling their obligation to the state and make sure to concentrate the sources of goods and financial resources on the state budget.

To stress discipline in production and business and to respect the economic law is the first important factor needed to stabilize the economic order.

ECONOMIC PLANNING, TRADE AND FINANCE

MEASURES TAKEN TO REDUCE COAL CONSUMPTION

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 6 Jun 81 p 1

[Article: "Ha Bac, Thai Binh Adjust Levels of Coal Consumption; Hanoi Uses Cinder As Fuel"]

[Text] Ha Bac and Thai Binh Provinces have just readjusted 68 coal consumption norms for almost all of the production sectors using large quantities of coal in the locality.

After a period of survey, testing and calculations based on economic and technical facts, Ha Bac Province readjusted 44 norms for 9 production sectors. These sectors use 70 percent of the coal consumed in the province. Almost all of the coal consumption norms for the production of building materials, processing of grain and industrial crops and industrial production are now lower than before. As a result, every year Ha Bac can save more than 14,000 tons of coal and replace 33,000 tons of good-grade coal by different kinds of coal of poorer quality.

Thai Binh Province readjusted 24 coal consumption norms for production of pottery, porcelain and glassware; distillation of essential oil; making of silk, pulp, etc. It set up a council for establishing coal consumption norms and sectors in charge of control and examination of level of coal consumption in the key production installations. It also affirmed the guideline for investing coal in the major products and the measures to combine management based on sectors and zones in regard to the use of coal, as well as built the organization of coal supply within different districts.

In the first 4 months this year, the Hanoi Coal Supply Corporation and Municipal Fuel Corporation retrieved 8,800 tons of cinder in such production installations using large quantities of coal as Yen Phu Power Plant, 8-3 Textile Mill, Sao Vang Rubber Factory, Hanoi Distillery, etc. The cinder was recycled and supplied in time to satisfy part of the municipality's need for fuel.

Within the municipality there presently are nearly 300 production installations of the central administration and of Hanoi itself with annual coal consumption ranging from 500 to tens of thousands of tons, in some cases as much as from 130,000 to 150,000 tons. By properly exploiting them as sources of cinder Hanoi will be able to overcome even better its present difficulty in fuel supply.

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ECONOMIC PLANNING, TRADE AND FINANCE

COMMERCE SUPPORTS DAILY EXISTENCE

Hanoi HANOI MOI in Vietnamese 16 May 81 p 3

[Interview with Nguyen Con, Commercial Service deputy director, by unnamed reporter; date and place not specified]

[Text] [Question] How do you rate the work of the commercial branch in support of daily existence in recent days?

[Answer] We have met more difficulties than opportunities. Difficulties, because production in all respects has not increased and is still below the required levels (the existence of policies notwithstanding), whereas the struggle target set for the sector was to provide staple commodities such as meat, fish, vegetables, bean curd, fuel, etc.

[Question] Some people note that it is hard to buy meat and fish although standards have been publicized. Please comment.

[Answer] Here, two components of the problem must be mentioned: commodity forces and commodity distribution. The commercial branch has made maximum efforts to organize the commodity forces. We have stayed close to level 1 fish sources and have overcome all difficulties so as to promptly receive and transport the commodity whenever it was available. We have organized meat purchases right in the localities and at agreed with prices for resale at supply prices. We have actively received meat and fat from level 1, and actively purchased and organized the shipping of refrigerated meat from the south. As a rule, each year the period following the Tet festival is always tense in terms of meat supply. In past years, during the months following Tet we announced the sale of only a quantity of meat corresponding to 1 block of stamps. Since the beginning of this year, the branch has announced the monthly sale of meat corresponding to 2 blocks of stamps (either all meat or half meat and half fat). Such monthly ration level for each cadre plus 1 kg of fish--the level for this also is being maintained--reflected the determination and efforts of the branch to serve daily existence. This being the case, why have there at times been discrepancies between announced levels and actual sales? The answer is that this happened beyond our wishes. This happened because we still are contingent upon the source of commodities, which, rather than early, have arrived late or irregularly. For instance, in mid-April fish was scarce, but in

late April and early May it came in successive shipments. Our spirit is to strive to keep in stock in sufficient quantities any commodity that has been announced for sale, but we are compelled to make extensions when we struck snags. So far the difficulties over fish supply have been overcome. We have just received timely and smoothly a quantity of fish enough to help us solve the April backlog and at the same time meet the May sales criteria. We are now stepping up meat purchase and pickup. Likewise, the meat pinch will be conquered soon.

[Question] Please tell us about the efforts of the branch regarding other commodities?

[Answer] We have properly organized the purchase, collection, shipping and storage of soybeans necessary to produce bean curd and sauce. Due to the efforts of the Sauce Enterprise, sauce production has been assured; consequently, this commodity is stable. According to state regulations, in a quarter we must assure the sale of 2 liters of sauce and fish sauce to each cadre or worker. In the first quarter alone, we sold 3 liters. In the second quarter, sauce caused no problems, but fish sauce is encountering difficulties because its supply relies mainly on level 1. Nevertheless, we will strive to supply each cadre, worker and civil servant with 2.5 liters of fish sauce and sauce in the second quarter. This level is a little lower than that in the first quarter but still higher than required. Each cadre, worker and civil servant is entitled to 1 kg of bean curd a month; however, the present difficulty is that the supply of electricity and water necessary for production is very unstable. To solve the problem, we have expanded contractual work and opened new shops at our bean curd enterprises. In recent days, bean curd production has reached 30 tons a day. This result is helping us solve the backlog from past months and proceed with May sales.

[Question] As a rule, April is the off season for vegetables. But this past April vegetable supply was smooth. Was this a result of the weather factor?

[Answer] This past April, the vegetable preharvest period generated no tense situation. In terms of distribution, it can be said that there was no vegetable off season in April. Favorable weather did play a role, but not by itself. In past years, the April vegetable shortage even occurred when weather was very favorable. Besides weather, the recent success in vegetable supply was caused mainly by improved leadership of the city, districts and the commercial branch over the production and purchase of vegetables. The city has the policies of economic flow, of contractual work in agriculture and of appropriate pricing. On the basis of these policies, the branch has stayed close to production and stepped up purchases. The branch has sold 10,500 tons of vegetables, out of the preharvest purchase and reserve of 1,000 tons of potatoes and 300 tons of green beans (equivalent to 1,500 tons of vegetables, and the April purchase of 8,000 tons of vegetables of all kinds. This level not only has greatly exceeded that of the preceding years' corresponding period, but it has also surpassed even the normal requirements of a single month according to current supply standards.

AGRICULTURE

BRIEFS

GIA LAI-KON TUM ECONOMIC CENTERS--Over the past 5 years, Gia Lai-Kon Tum Province has received more than 120,000 people from the provinces of Hai Hung, Ha Nam Ninh, Nghe Tinh, Quang Nam-Da Nang...who came to build a new economic zone. Four thousand leading cadres from various branches and echelons, and scientific-technical cadres from other provinces have beefed up the organs, offices and branches in the province. With this reinforcement, Gia Lai-Kon Tum has built 12 state farms, 13 farming stations, 24 cooperatives and 50 agricultural production collectives in 72 new economic centers in the province. As a first step, the province has rationally reorganized its force, combining the task of economic construction with national defense. [Text] [Hanoi HANOI MOI in Vietnamese 25 Mar 81 p 4]

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CSO: 4209/381

LIGHT INDUSTRY

IMPORTANCE OF SMALL INDUSTRY, HANDICRAFTS STRESSED

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 6 Jun 81 p 1

[Editorial: "An Important Productive Force of Socialism"]

[Text] After 20 years of transformation, building and development, our country's small industrial and handicraft sector has not ceased to grow up and occupies a major role in the national economy and social life.

The value of small industrial and handicraft production accounts for more than 40 percent of the value of national gross industrial production and two-thirds of the value of local industrial production. The sector has produced tens of thousands of items, from the small miscellaneous ones very necessary for the standard of living to the ones having high export value. Every year it receives from 70,000 to 100,000 workers, raising the force of handicraftsmen throughout the country to 1.5 million people and contributing to speeding up the new division of labor in the countryside and achieving the combination of agriculture and industry from the village unit to the district and provincial level. Many cooperatives have become semimechanized and quite a few others have reached a higher level of mechanization. With a large variety of products ranging from means of production to consumer goods, the sector has effectively served agriculture and other economic sectors and national defense and has contributed to the socialist accumulation.

Such achievements are the results of a correct implementation of the economic line and policy of the party and state. As we carry on the socialist industrialization under the conditions of our country moving directly from a small-scale agricultural production to socialism without going through the stage of capitalist development, we cannot fail to exploit every force and every capability of different sectors in terms of labor, resources and producing power, nor to use every form and scope of organization suitable for developing production and improving the standard of living. On the industrial front, in addition to striving to build the centrally-run and local industries, we need very much to care on a permanent basis about expanding small industry and handicrafts in the collective economy and to encourage both individual and private production.

A component of the local industry, small industry and handicrafts directly contributes to speeding up the process of forming the district agricultural-industrial and provincial industrial-agricultural structure. It plays an important immediate and long-term role in the national economy and social life. To step up the production of consumer goods and local industry in the direction outlined in the resolution of the 6th Plenum of the VCP Central Committee we must ceaselessly develop small industry and handicrafts.

As there is a lack of balance in many areas of the economy, our industry, big and small, does encounter difficulties. Because of its inherent characteristics, small industry is in better conditions than big industry since it has both many realistic capabilities to exploit and favorable conditions for operating in a mobile and flexible manner. It is in a strong position to be actively exploiting and fully using sources of raw materials in the country and in different localities and to practice thrift so as to produce the same or larger amounts of goods than before with a smaller volume of materials. Lacking electric power, it can switch to manual production or use machinery whenever power is available. Lacking high-grade coal, it can use in its place peat, local coal, cinder or plants and grass. Lacking motorized means of transportation, it can switch to rudimentary means. It also is capable of operating flexibly by changing the lines of goods it produces to suit the conditions of raw materials; if it cannot make this line of goods, it can switch to another one.

As the results of carrying out the state plan in 1980 and in the first months of this year have indicated, correctly implementing the guidelines and policies mentioned in Resolution 6 of the Central Committee and Resolution 26 of the Political Bureau means we can maintain and develop small industry and handicrafts under any circumstances. Combining planning with using the goods-money relationship and ensuring a correct combination of three interests is an effective lever that stimulates the active producing capacity and creativity of production installations and workers.

The immediate task of the small industrial and handicraft sector is to uphold the spirit of self-sufficiency, to strive to exploit every potential and existing capability, to develop as quickly as possible production of the common consumer goods, to organize a good repair service network and to satisfy the people's daily needs. Try to provide at any cost rudimentary and improved tools to all sectors of the national economy, first of all agriculture. Increase further the pace of producing goods for export, including the ones made of domestic raw materials and made for foreign countries. All production installations have the responsibility to deliver the right quantities of products their obligation requires, to sell outside-of-the-plan products to the state-operated commercial organizations and marketing cooperatives so as to let the state concentrate all of the sources of goods and ensure supply, and to form a force to compete with the unorganized market.

The great strength of the collective production sector in industry must be exploited much more and better. The federations of small industrial and handicraft cooperatives of all levels must be further improved so as to fulfill the function of being the organizations of the collective economy and manual workers.

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BIOGRAPHIC

INFORMATION ON VIETNAMESE PERSONALITIES

[The following information on Vietnamese personalities has been extracted from Vietnamese-language sources published in Hanoi, unless otherwise indicated. Asterisked job title indicates that this is the first known press reference to this individual functioning in this capacity.]

Lê Bửu[?] [LEE BUWUR] M.S.

Acting Director of the Physical Education and Sports Service, Ho Chi Minh City; on 5 May 81 announcement that this individual was elected to the People's Council, Ho Chi Minh City was reported in the cited source. (Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG 5 May 81 pp 1, 4)

Nguyễn Minh Cầm [NGUYEENX MINH CAAMS]

Acting Director of the Finance Service, Ho Chi Minh City; on 5 May 81 announcement that this individual was elected to the People's Council, Ho Chi Minh City was reported in the cited source. (Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG 5 May 81 pp 1, 4)

[NOTE: In a previous report the spelling of this individual's name was given as Nguyễn Minh Cầm NGUYEENX MINH CAAMR]

Nguyễn Tiến Chương [NGUYEENX TIEENS CHUWONG]

Deputy Secretary of the VCP Committee, Nghe Tinh Province; on 16 May 81 he attended an awards ceremony in his province for achievements in sports and physical education. (THE DUC THE THAO 23 May 81 p 2)

Hồ Đắc Di [HOOF DAWCS ZI], Prof

Born 21 May 1900 in Ha Tinh; is a native of Hue; participated in the August Revolution in 1945 and the resistance against the French until 1954; was President of the College of Medicine and Pharmacy and, after the college was divided in two, of the College of Medicine; retired in 1978; has been a member of the Vietnam Fatherland Front Central Committee since the founding of the VFF; was a member of the National Assembly, 2d through 5th terms, and at times a member of the National Assembly's Standing Committee; was President of the Vietnam General Association of Medicine, 2d through 9th terms; is a holder of the Government's Resistance Order

First and Second Class and Labor Order First and Second Class; from a biographical sketch in the cited source on the occasion of subject's 80th birthday. (Y HOC VIET NAM No 3, May-Jun 80 p 2)

Phan Văn Diêm [PHAN VAWN ZIEEM]

*Deputy Director of the Southern Region Electric Power Corporation [Cong ty Dien luc Mien nam]; attended ceremonies in Hanoi on 19 December 1980 to commemorate the 25th anniversary of Vietnam's electric power sector. (KY THUAT DIEN LUC No 2, Mar-Apr 81 p 27)

Trần Văn Du [TRAAWF VAWN ZU], Doctor of Veterinary Medicine

Vice President of the Ho Chi Minh City Association of Patriotic Intellectuals; on 5 May 81 announcement that this individual was elected to the People's Council, Ho Chi Minh City was reported in the cited source. (Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG 5 May 81 pp 1, 4)

Mai Duy Dưỡng [MAI ZUY ZUWOWNGX]

President of the Vietnam Table Tennis Association; his interview on Vietnamese table tennis prospects appeared in the cited source. (Ho Chi Minh City TIN SANG 25 Apr 81 p 4)

Dương Văn Đây [ZUWOWN VAWN DAAYF]

Deputy Secretary of the VCP Committee, 1st Precinct, Ho Chi Minh City; on 5 May 81 announcement that this individual was elected to the People's Council, Ho Chi Minh City was reported in the cited source. (Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG 5 May 81 pp 1, 4)

Nghị Đoàn [NGHIJ DOANF]

*Member of the Standing Committee of the VCP Committee, Ho Chi Minh City; announcement of his election to the People's Council, Ho Chi Minh City appeared in the cited source. (Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG 6 May 81 p 1)

Nguyễn Hải [NGUYEENX HAIR]

*Deputy Secretary of the VCP Committee, Tay Ninh Province; on 29 Apr 81 he attended the inaugural ceremony of work on Dau Tieng-Tay Ninh Water Conservancy System. (Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG 30 Apr 81 p 1)

Trương Thị Hồng [TRUOWNG THIJ HOONGF], M.S. in Physics

*Member of the Standing Committee of the VCP Committee, Ho Chi Minh City; *Deputy Director of the Education Service, Ho Chi Minh City; on 5 May 81 announcement that this individual was elected to the People's Council, Ho Chi Minh City was reported in the cited source. (Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG 5 May 81 pp 1, 4)

Lê Hùng [LEE HUNGF]

*Acting Chief of the Institute of General Planning and Design [Vien Qui Hoach va Thiet Ke Tong Hop], Ministry of Building; is the author of an article in the cited source on the implementation of piece-work wages in the institute. (XAY DUNG No 3, Mar 81 pp 3-4, 8)

Nguyễn Thị Liêm [NGUYEENX THIJ LIEEM]

*Deputy Director of the War Invalids and Social Welfare Service, Ho Chi Minh City; announcement of her election to the People's Council, Ho Chi Minh City appeared in the cited source. (Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG 6 May 81 p 1)

Ngô Luân [NGOO LUAAN]

*Director General of the XUNHASABA General Corporation [Book and Periodical Export-Import General Corporation]; on 22 Apr 81 he presented a quantity of Russian books to the Culture and Information Service, Ho Chi Minh City. (Ho Chi Minh City TIN SANG 25 Apr 81 p 7)

Phạm Nguyên Lương [PHAMJ NGUYEEN LUWOWNG]

*Chief of the Labor and Wages Department of the Ministry of Building; is the author of an article in the cited source on paying attention to laborer living conditions to step up production. (XAY DUNG No 3, Mar 81 pp 1-2)

Nguyễn Sĩ Minh [NGUYEENX SIX MINH]

*Director of the Commerce Service, Haiphong; his article "Assuring Supplies for Salaried Workers in Haiphong" appeared in the cited source. (NHAN DAN 12 Jun 81 p 2)

Phan Mỹ [PHAN MYX]

Minister; former head of the Electric Power General Department [Tong cuc Dien luc]; attended ceremonies in Hanoi on 19 December 1980 to commemorate the 25th anniversary of Vietnam's electric power sector. (KY THUAT DIEN LUC No 2, Mar-Apr 81 p 27)

Lê Thành Phụng [LEE THANH PHUNGJ]

Member of the Standing Committee of the VCP Committee, Ho Chi Minh City; Director of the Industry Service, Ho Chi Minh City; on 5 May 81 announcement that this individual was elected to the People's Council, Ho Chi Minh City was reported in the cited source. (Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG 5 May 81 pp 1, 4)

Huỳnh Châu Sổ [HUYNHF CHAAU SOOR]

Vice Chairman of the State Inspection Commission; on 21 Apr 81 he attended a conference in Ho Chi Minh City of Ho Chi Minh City State Inspectors. (Ho Chi Minh City TIN SANG 22 Apr 81 p 1)

Trần Tấn [TRAANF TAANS]

*Vice Chairman of the People's Committee, Hanoi; on 8 Jun 81 he attended a meeting of the Hanoi People's Council when measures were discussed on promoting production and market management. (NHAN DAN 11 Jun 81 p 1)

Hoàng Thao [HOANGF THAO]

Vice Minister of Interior; on 6 May 81 he awarded decorations to public security units for accomplishments in sports and physical education. (THE DUC THE THAO 16 May 81 p 2)

Phạm Phương Thảo [PHAMJ PHUOWNG THAOR]

Deputy Secretary of the Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth Union, Ho Chi Minh City; on 5 May 81 announcement that this individual was elected to the People's Council, Ho Chi Minh City was reported in the cited source. (Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG 5 May 81 pp 1, 4)

Phan Minh Thảo [PHAN MINH THAOR], *Lt Col

Is the author of an article in the cited source entitled "Understanding the Formation and Development of Military Science in the World." (TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN No 4, Apr 81 pp 52-63)

Nguyễn Văn Thắng [NGUYEENX VAWN THAWNGS]

*Acting Chairman of the People's Committee, Tay Ninh Province; on 29 Apr 81 he attended inaugural ceremonies of the starting of work on the Dau Tieng-Tay Ninh Water Conservancy System. (Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG 30 Apr 81 p 1)

Nguyễn Văn Thuyền [NGUYEENX VAWN THUYEENF]

Member of the Standing Committee of the VCP Committee, Ho Chi Minh City; Member of the People's Committee, Ho Chi Minh City; Chairman of the Inspection Committee, Ho Chi Minh City; on 5 May 81 announcement that this individual was elected to the People's Council, Ho Chi Minh City was reported in the cited source. (Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG 5 May 81 pp 1, 4)

Lê Thế Thường [LEE THEES THUWOWNGR]

Acting Director of the Culture and Information Service, Ho Chi Minh City; on 22 Apr 81 he accepted a gift of Russian books from XUNIASABA General Corporation. (Ho Chi Minh City TIN SANG 25 Apr 81 p 7)

Phạm Phú Tiết [PHAMJ PHUS TIEETS], Deceased

Former Justice of the Review Council of the 5th Interregion Court; Vice Chairman of the 5th Inter Region Lien Viet [League for the National Union of Vietnam]; Member of the Central Committee of the Vietnam Fatherland Front; Researcher in

ancient classical opera in the Arts Department, Ministry of Culture; he was in retirement when he died on 7 Jun 81 at age 86 following a protracted illness.
(NHAN DAN 11 Jun 81 p 4)

Nguyễn Phước Tinh [NGUYEENX PHUOWCS TINHR]

*Deputy Head of the Communications and Transportation Service, Minh Hai Province; his comments on innovations in his service appeared in the cited source. (GIAO THONG VAN TAI 20 May 81 p 2)

Đào Xuân Trà [DAOX XUAAN TRAF], Asst Prof

Director of the Institute of Ophthalmology, Vietnam General Association of Medicine; his name appears at the end of an article in the cited source by members of the staff at the institute. (Y HOC VIET NAM No 3, May-Jun 80 p 14)

Đường Quang Trung [ZUOWONG QUANG TRUNG], Doctor

*Director of the Public Health Service, Ho Chi Minh City; *Chairman of the Ho Chi Minh City Red Cross Association; announcement of his election to the Ho Chi Minh City People's Council appeared in the cited source. (Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG 6 May 81 p 4)

Lê Thanh Vân [LEE THANH VAAN]

Member of the Standing Committee of the VCP Committee, Ho Chi Minh City; on 5 May 81 announcement that this individual was elected to the People's Council, Ho Chi Minh City was reported in the cited source. (Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG 5 May 81 pp 1, 4)

Huỳnh Văn Ve [HUYNHF VAWN VE]

*Was Vice Chairman of the People's Committee of Con Dao District in charge of agricultural production at an unspecified time but prior to setting up the current Vung Tau-Con Dao Special Zone; mentioned in an article in the cited source on the new lifestyle at the Vung Tau-Con Dao Fishing Enterprise.
(VAN HOA NGHE THUAT No 4, Apr 81 p 18)

Bùi Trọng Vị [BUIF TRONGJ VIJ]

*Deputy Chief of the Propaganda and Training Department of the VCP Committee of Kien Giang Province; he is the author of an article in the cited source entitled "Some Initial Experiences and Developments in Party Building Work in Kien Giang."
(XAY DUNG DANG No 1, Jan 81 pp 30-33)

Phạm Văn Vũ [PHAMJ VAWN VUWU], Sr Col

Is the author of an article in the cited source entitled "Exploit Weapons and Technical Equipment To Improve Troop Combat Strength." (TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN No 4, Apr 81 pp 16-21)

Đỗ Tấn Xưa [DOOX TAANS XUWA]

*Director of the Labor Service, Ho Chi Minh City; on 5 May 81 announcement that this individual was elected to the People's Council, Ho Chi Minh City was reported in the cited source. (Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG 5 May 81 pp 1, 4)

CSO: 4209/409

PUBLICATIONS

TABLE OF CONTENTS OF BOOK ON FORMULATING STATE BUDGET

Hanoi LAP VA CHAP HANH NGAN SACH NHA NUOC in Vietnamese 1978

[Introduction and table of contents of book "Formulating and Implementing the State Budget"; 34,185 copies printed at the Tong Hop Printing Plant in Ho Chi Minh City, printing completed in December 1978]

[Text] Introduction

On 25 March 1977, the Council of Ministers issued resolution number 76-CP concerning the matter of guiding the implementation and formulation of uniform laws for the entire country.

In keeping with this resolution and in order to create the conditions for all sectors to fully and scrupulously implement the laws of the state, the Ministry of Finance has collected and selected the primary documents that have been promulgated by the Council of Ministers and the Ministry of Finance concerning the procedures for formulating and implementing the state budget.

All of the documents presented herein are currently in effect and must be complied with by all sectors and levels in order to put financial management, in particular, and economic management, in general, on a regular basis.

Because this book is very large, we have divided it into many volumes. This is volume I, the other volumes will be published at a later date.

May 1978
The Ministry of Finance

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Decree number 168-CP dated 20 October 1961 of the Council of Ministers promulgating the Statutes on Formulating and Complying with the State Budget (pp 5-6)
(signed by Premier Phan Van Dong on behalf of the Council of Ministers)

The Statutes on Formulating and Implementing the State Budget (pp 7-23)
(signed by Premier Phan Van Dong on behalf of the Council of Ministers)

Ministry of Finance Decision number 03-TC/TDT dated 30 March 1972 promulgating
accounting regulations for units that use budgets (p 24)
(signed on behalf of the Minister of Finance by Vice Minister Trinh Van Binh)

Accounting regulations for units that use budgets (pp 25-87)
(signed on behalf of the Minister of Finance by Vice Minister Trinh Van Binh)

Appendix Number 1: accounting documentation and records for units that use budgets
(pp 88-110)

Appendix Number 2: instructions on keeping corresponding accounts (pp 111-122)

Appendix Number 3: accounting reports and charts for units that use budgets (pp 123-231)

Joint Ministry of Finance-State Bank Directive number 32-CT/LB dated 26 December 1962
on the allocation of budget capital to budget agencies and units (allocations
under ceilings) (pp 232-266)
(on behalf of the director of the State Bank, signed by Deputy Director Tran
Duong; on behalf of the Minister of Finance, signed by Vice Minister Trinh
Van Binh)

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PUBLICATIONS

PUBLISHER'S NOTE TO BOOK BY LE DUAN

Hanoi PHAN DAU XAU DUNG NUOC VIET NAM XA HOI CHU NGHIA GIAU DEP in Vietnamese 1979 pp 5-6

[Introduction to book "Endeavoring To Build a Prosperous and Beautiful Socialist Vietnam" by Le Duan; published by Su That Publishing House, Hanoi, 1979; 13,200 copies printed at the Tien Bo Printing House in Hanoi; printing completed 15 Apr 79]

[Text] Publisher's Note

At the 25th Plenum of the 3rd Party Central Committee, Le Duan, general secretary of the party, presented the elements of the documents presented at the 4th National Congress of Delegates of the Party.

His presentation consisted of four main parts:

- The war of resistance against the United States for national salvation;
- The line on the socialist revolution in the new stage;
- Cultural matters;
- The party, the state and the mass organizations.

In part I, Le Duan spoke in general terms about our people's war of resistance against the United States for national salvation, pointing out the factors that led to victory as well as the lessons and experiences gained in the national democratic revolution, in general, and the war of resistance against the United States for national salvation, in particular.

In part II, Le Duan presented the general line of the socialist revolution in our country, especially its theoretical and practical bases and the fundamentals of the system of socialist collective ownership; he also presented the line on building our country's economy under the conditions of advancing from small-scale production to large-scale socialist production.

In part III, Le Duan presented the primary factors involved in building the new culture and molding the new, socialist man.

In part IV, Le Duan discussed the mechanism of collective ownership and the relationship among the party, the masses and the state; he especially emphasized the leadership role of the party in the new stage of the revolution.

In order to research and gain an understanding of the contents of the documents of the 4th National Congress of Delegates of the Party, we must study this speech by Le Duan.

We have been given permission to publish this important speech in a book entitled "Endeavoring To Build a Prosperous and Beautiful Socialist Vietnam."

We hereby respectfully present this book to readers.

August 1978
Su That Publishing House

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CSO: 4209/169

PUBLICATIONS

LAWS, DOCUMENTS ON PEOPLE'S ORGANS OF CONTROL

Hanoi LUAT VE VIEN KIEM SAT NHAN DAN VA CAC VAN BAN CO LIEN QUAN in Vietnamese 1978
pp 5, 7, 8, 16-18, 21-25, 31-32, 36-37, 43-44, 65, 71

[Introduction and table of contents of book "The Laws Regarding the People's Organs of Control and Related Documents; published by Su That Publishing House, Hanoi, 1978; 15,185 copies printed at the Tran Phu Printing Plant in Ho Chi Minh City; size: 14 x 20; publishing number: 55; printing number: 130/78; printing completed 15 November 1978; put in circulation November 1978]

[Text] Publisher's Note

When the Socialist Republic of Vietnam was born, the National Assembly of the entire country (6th Legislature) decided during its first session:

"Until the new Constitution is adopted, the state of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam shall be organized and shall operate on the basis of the 1959 Constitution of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

...As regards the current laws (laws, regulations, decrees, resolutions, decisions, circulars and so forth) of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the Republic of South Vietnam, the Council of Ministers of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam will provide guidance so that they are implemented in a manner consistent with the actual situation."

On 25 March 1977, in keeping with this resolution of the National Assembly, the Council of Ministers adopted Resolution number 76-CP, which promulgates a list of current laws to be implemented on a uniform basis throughout the country. On the basis of this list and with the collaboration of the Supreme People's Organ of Control, we have published "The Laws on the People's Organs of Control and Related Documents" to assist the various sectors and levels.

January 1978
Su That Publishing House

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Law of the President of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, number 20-LCT dated 26 July 1960, promulgating the law on the organization of the People's Organs of Control (p 7)
(signed: Ho Chi Minh)

The Law on the Organization of the People's Organs of Control (pp 8-16)
(on behalf of the session presidium, signed: Hoang Van Hoan)

Law of the President of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, number 12-LCT dated 18 April 1962, promulgating the specific regulations on the organization of the Supreme People's Organ of Control (p 17)
(signed: Ho Chi Minh, president of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam)

The specific regulations on the organization of the Supreme People's Organ of Control (pp 18-21)
(signed by Truong Chinh, chairman of the Standing Committee of the National Assembly of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam)

Law of the President of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, number 18-LCT dated 27 January 1970, promulgating regulations that revise and amend the specific regulations on the organization of the Supreme People's Organ of Control (p 22)
(signed: Ton Duc Thang, president of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam)

The regulations revising and amending the specific regulations on the organization of the Supreme People's Organ of Control (pp 23-24)
(signed by Truong Chinh, chairman of the Standing Committee of the National Assembly of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam)

Premier's Circular number 09-TTg dated 1 February 1963 on the working relationship between the People's Organs of Control on the various levels and the agencies subordinate to the Council of Ministers and the local state agencies (pp 25-31)
(signed by Premier Pham Van Dong)

Premier's Circular number 139-TTg dated 28 May 1973 providing guidance with regard to a number of matters concerning the prosecution of crimes detected in the process of implementing Resolution 228-NQ/TW and the other resolutions of the party and state (pp 32-36)
(signed on behalf of the premier by Deputy Premier Le Thanh Nghi)

Decree of the Provisional Revolutionary Council of Ministers number 01-SL dated 15 March 1976 defining the organization of the People's Courts and the People's Organs of Control (pp 37-43)
(signed on behalf of the Council of Advisors by Chairman Nguyen Huu Tho and on behalf of the Council of Ministers by Chairman Huynh Tan Phat)

Circular of the Ministry of Justice number 10-BTP/TT dated 27 April 1976 providing guidance with regard to the organization and operation of the People's Organs of Control (pp 44-64)

Premier's Circular number 556-TTg dated 24 December 1958 on strengthening leadership in the areas of arrests and prosecution (pp 65-71)
(signed by Premier Pham Van Dong)

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